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REDEFINING TRADE-BASED MARKET 
MANIPULATION 
Matthijs Nelemans∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. The Subject, Reason, and Objective of the Article 
Trade-based market manipulation (“manipulation”) is thought of as 
trading shares specifically to cause a price change.  The behavior may 
best be explained by an example.  Consider a trader willing to sell one 
million shares of ABC stock to an institutional investor in a contractual, 
person-to-person, deal.  In the morning, the two parties enter into a 
contractual agreement, stating that the closing price of the ABC shares 
on the exchange will be taken as the transaction price.  In the afternoon, 
the trader buys 10,000 shares of ABC on the exchange for no other reason 
than to inflate the price from $10 to $11, thus fixing the closing price 
higher in his favor.  Obviously, the trader benefits at the expense of the 
institutional investor. 
Many nations have regulations against manipulation: Section 10(b) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“SEA”), Rule 10b-5, and 
Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA prohibit manipulation in the United States; 
Section 1(2)(a) of the Market Abuse Directive (“MAD”) 2003/6/EC in the 
European Union; and Section 1041A of the Corporations Act (“CA”) 2001 
in Australia.1  The problem is that these regulations, which will be 
discussed in Section I.A.1., are overly broad.  The irony is that the 
                                                        
∗ Tilburg Law School and Tilburg Law and Economics Center.  For helpful discussions 
and comments I would particularly like to thank Marc Groenhuijsen, François Kristen, 
Merritt Fox, Jeffrey Gordon, Katharina Pistor, Alan Palmiter, Ok-Rial Song, Mathias Siems, 
Martin Gelter, Kristoffel Grechenig, Sharon Hannes, Jun Zhou, Gijsbert Zwart, Alice 
Ribbink, Alan Littler, Steve Kuchta, Garrett Law, David Ulrich, and seminar participants at 
Tilburg Law School, Columbia Law School, and Tilburg Law and Economics Center. 
1 The repression of trade-based market manipulation goes back more than a century.  
One of the first cases in the United Kingdom occurred in 1892: Scott v. Brown, Doering, 
McNab & Co., (1892) 2 Q.B. 724, 730 61 L.J. (N.S.) 738, 741 (C.A.).  The first case in the 
United States arose in 1933: United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).  See 
LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3986.10-20 (VIII Revised 2004); see 
also Hubert De Vauplane & Odile Simart, The Concept of Securities Manipulation and Its 
Foundations in France and the USA, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 203, 206-10 (1997). 
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regulations, in conjunction with common enforcement actions,2 may ban 
welfare-enhancing trades. 
Unsurprisingly, the status quo has instigated an academic debate 
about the just definition of manipulation.3  Fischel and Ross delivered an 
analysis of existing definitions and suggested an improved definition.4  
They concluded that “there is no objective definition of manipulation,”5 
and so, “[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it 
focuses entirely on the intent of the trader.”6  Yet, their argument for 
shifting from an objective definition to a subjective one, which will be 
examined in Section I.A.2, has both a practical and doctrinal flaw. 
This Article aims to confront these problems by proposing an 
improved definition of manipulation, which is not only useful to design 
future policy, but also to interpret existing prohibitions.  Further, since 
defining behavior is the start of a natural research sequence, other points 
of controversy can be more readily discussed, such as the tracing of 
manipulation,7 the incidence of manipulation,8 and the justification for 
                                                        
2 There is a continuous stream of enforcement actions.  See, e.g., Rajesh K. Aggarwal & 
Guojon Wu, Stock Market Manipulations, 79 J. BUS. L. 1915, 1935, 1938 (2006).  Their sample 
includes 142 manipulation cases brought by the SEC between 1990 and 2001.  About half 
the cases included some form of trade-based market manipulation.  Further, European and 
Australian authorities were recently involved in two high profile cases.  The German 
regulator investigated Citigroup in 2005.  See Päivi Munter, Criminal Investigation Sought in 
Citigroup Bond Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005.  The Australian regulator came to a 
settlement with a director of HIH Insurance, Ltd.  See also David Elias, Adler Guilty on 4 
Charges, THE AGE, Feb. 17, 2005. 
3 See, e.g., Guido A. Ferrarini, The European Market Abuse Directive, 41 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 711 (2004); Omri Yadlin, Is Stock Manipulation Bad? Questioning the Conventional 
Wisdom with the Evidence from the Israeli Experience, 2 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 839, 842 (2001); 
VIVIEN GOLDWASSER, STOCK MARKET MANIPULATION AND SHORT SELLING 99-138 (1999); 
Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial 
Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 507-10 (1991); Gary L. Gastineau & Robert A. Jarrow, 
Large-Trader Impact and Market Regulation, 47 FIN. ANAL. J. 40, 41 (1991). 
4 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“Manipulative trades could be defined as 
profitable trades made with ‘bad’ intent—in other words, trades that meet the following 
conditions: (I) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader 
has no belief that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the 
resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his 
possession of valuable information.”). 
5 Id. at 512. 
6 Id. at 510. 
7 See, e.g., Marcello Minenna, The Detection of Market Abuse on Financial Markets: A 
Quantitative Approach, at 32-33 (2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=483962 (2005); LARRY 
HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES 273-74 (2003); Yadlin, supra note 3, at 849-50; IOSCO, 
INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING MARKET MANIPULATION 12-21 (2000); GOLDWASSER, 
supra note 3, at 113-19; Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of Securities 
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regulation.9  However, the improved definition does not resolve the 
enforcement complexities, nor does it examine the incidence of 
manipulation. 
1. Current Prohibitions and Their Shortcomings 
In the United States, Section 10(b) of the SEA10 and Rule 10b-511 have 
become the most important prohibitions to counteract manipulation.  
The language of the Statute is at least as important as the language of the 
Rule, since courts have interpreted the Statute more narrowly than the 
Rule.12  According to the Statute, it is unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative 
or deceptive device or contrivance.”  Section 10(b) of the SEA, like Rule 
10b-5, is so broad that informed traders who execute large transactions 
                                                                                                                            
Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 291-94 (1994); Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 519-21; 
Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 44-45; J.I. GOLDSTEIN & T.A. LEVINE, SECOND ANNUAL 
MARKET MANIPULATION 120-34 (1990). 
8 See, e.g., Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in 
an Emerging Stock Market, 78 J. FINAN. ECON. 203 (2005); Guolin Jiang, Paul G. Mahoney & 
Jianping Mei, Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 147 
(2005); Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 2; Yadlin, supra note 3; Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools 
and the Securities Exchange Act, 51 J. FINAN. ECON 343 (1999). 
9 See, e.g., Thel, supra note 7, at 287-97; Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 553; Gastineau & 
Jarrow, supra note 3, at 45. 
10 Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange. . . (b) To use or 
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security 
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
11 Rule 10b-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or 
any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any 
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951). 
12 ALAN PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULATION 268-69 (2002). 
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might be qualified as manipulators even though they discount new 
information into the stock price.  It is common knowledge that informed 
traders are necessary to keep financial markets efficient.13  As a result, by 
erring on the side of caution, they may forego welfare-enhancing trades. 
Another statute against manipulation is Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA,14 
which has become obsolete due to the high burden of proof and its 
inapplicability to the over-the-counter market.15  This provision applies 
to “a series of transactions in any security. . . raising or depressing the 
price of such security.”  Remarkably, it encompasses all transactions 
raising or depressing the price, thus including transactions that discount 
new information in the price and secure efficient prices.  I recognize that 
the applicability of the provision is limited by a mens rea element: “for 
the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.”  
Nevertheless, it is inaccurate to compensate an overly broad actus reus 
with a mens rea element.  This would still mean that traders are not 
allowed to trade and discount new information in the price, if it is for the 
purpose of inducing other traders to follow suit.16 
In the European Union, twenty-five Member States have 
implemented a new prohibition on manipulation in the last few years: 
Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003/6/EC.  In short, this provision requires that 
market participants refrain from trading when their transactions would 
                                                        
13 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at 235-43. 
14 Section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
any facility of any national securities exchange, or for any member of a 
national securities exchange . . .  (2) To effect, alone or with one or 
more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or in connection with any security-
based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act) with respect to such security creating actual or 
apparent active trading in such security, or raising or depressing the 
price of such security, for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale 
of such security by others. 
15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2000). 
15 See ALAN R. BROMBERG AND LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND 
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 6:67, 195-97 (2d ed. 2003). 
16 Public companies frequently buy large amounts of shares, inducing the market to 
purchase shares and to bring the stock price to the fundamental value.  See, e.g., Jesse Fried, 
Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 426-
34 (2000).  Due to the overly broad actus reus, Section 9(a)(2) SEA 1934 could in fact restrict 
public companies to use buy-back programs for signaling purposes. 
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secure the price at an abnormal level.17  Although the law does not define 
“abnormal level,” the prohibition might cover the situation in which a 
trader increases the price from $10 to $11, provided that the price had 
previously been stable at $10 for a sufficient period of time.  However, 
the European prohibition ignores the fact that this trader could have 
impounded new information in the price.  Therefore, it may criminalize 
welfare-enhancing trades and deter legitimate traders. 
Furthermore, the Australian prohibition in Section 1041A CA 2001 is 
limited to transactions that create an artificial price.18  Admittedly, 
artificial price is more precise than abnormal price, but the concept still 
leaves the potential for multiple interpretations.  The financial markets 
regulator (“regulator”) could use the prohibition on manipulation to 
counteract various transactions, i.e. all transactions raising or depressing 
the price, uninformed transactions raising or depressing the price, 
transactions having the purpose of raising or depressing the price, or 
transactions moving the price away from the fundamental value.  Evidently, 
the regulator has discretionary powers to apply the prohibition as long 
as the term artificial price or the behavior that results in an artificial price 
is not defined precisely. 
What can be concluded from all of these prohibitions?  It seems that 
neither Section 10(b), nor Rule 10b-5, nor Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA 
precisely delineates manipulation.  Even though courts have interpreted 
and qualified the type of behavior that counts as manipulation, 
significant ambiguity in defining the term “manipulation” still exists.19  
                                                        
17 Section 1(2)(a) MAD 2003 provides: 
Market manipulation shall mean transactions or orders to trade which 
give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the supply 
of, demand for or price of financial instruments, or which secure, by a 
person, or persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or several 
financial instruments at an abnormal or artificial level. 
Market Abuse Directive, Section 1(2)(a) 2003/6/EC. 
18 Section 1041A CA 2001 provides: 
A person must not take part in, or carry out . . . : (a) a transaction that 
has or is likely to have; or (b) 2 or more transactions that have or are 
likely to have; the effect of: (c) creating an artificial price for trading in 
financial products on a financial market operated in this jurisdiction; 
or (d) maintaining at a level that is artificial (whether or not it was 
previously artificial) a price for trading in financial products on a 
financial market operated in this jurisdiction. 
Corporations Act, § 1041A 2001 (Australia). 
19 See, e.g., A.A. SOMMER JR., FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §§ 6.01-6.06 
(2004) (providing an overview of the caselaw); BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 15, at 
§§ 6:56-6:75; GOLDSTEIN & LEVINE, supra note 7, at 3-99. 
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Moreover, the European and Australian prohibitions may be 
overinclusive due to the vague delineation of manipulation.  The 
European and Australian courts have not produced any case law that 
sets a precedent to protect informed traders.  The problem, therefore, is 
that these prohibitions most likely cover legitimate welfare-enhancing 
trades. 
a. An Academic Definition and its Shortcomings 
The definition of manipulation has been widely debated, and legal 
scholars have suggested several definitions attempting to cover the 
various facets of manipulation.  Fischel and Ross wrote a provocative 
article in the early 1990s discussing the need for regulating 
manipulation, to which Thel levied a serious reply.20  Fischel and Ross 
analyzed existing definitions and suggested an improved one.21  They 
concluded that “there is no objective definition of manipulation,”22 and 
so, “[t]he only definition that makes any sense is subjective—it focuses 
entirely on the intent of the trader.”23  Thel did not question the 
definition suggested by Fischel and Ross, but merely focused on the 
arguments regarding regulating manipulation.24  Yet, the shift from an 
objective to a subjective definition is both practically and doctrinally 
flawed. 
What is the practical flaw?  In situations of manipulation, bad 
intentions can have both practical and beneficial effects.  Envision an 
informed trader who intends to manipulate the price.  This trader does not 
cause any damage, despite his bad intentions. On the contrary, his 
trading is actually beneficial to the market as a whole, discounting new 
information in the price.  Evidently, this type of trader should be 
excluded from the prohibition, but this is only possible if a clear objective 
                                                        
20 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3; Thel, supra note 7. 
21 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“Manipulative trades could be defined as 
profitable trades made with ‘bad’ intent - in other words, trades that meet the following 
conditions: (1) the trading is intended to move prices in a certain direction; (2) the trader 
has no belief that the prices would move in this direction but for the trade; and (3) the 
resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s ability to move prices and not from his 
possession of valuable information.”). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Thel, too, derives the normative judgment from the intent of the trader.  Thel, supra 
note 7, at 221 n.17 (“When used in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, the 
word ‘manipulation’ means buying a security for the purpose of increasing the reported 
price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the reported price.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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definition of manipulation exists.  For this reason, focusing entirely on the 
trader’s bad intent does not make sense.  Moreover, traders with good 
intent sometimes execute detrimental transactions.  An uninformed trader 
who has no intentions of manipulating the price may exercise large price 
pressure and cause extensive damage. One should be able to qualify this 
behavior as manipulation, e.g. in civil cases.  Yet, according to Fischel 
and Ross’s suggested definition, this behavior could not amount to 
manipulation, since there was no intent, notwithstanding the significant 
damages. 
There is also a doctrinal flaw.  When it comes down to defining 
prohibited behavior, legal scholars commonly agree that a prohibition 
should merely cover objective undesirable behavior.  Indeed, no one is 
punishable for their thoughts—cogitationis poenam nemo patitur. This 
means one cannot automatically shift from an objective to a subjective 
prohibition.  Fischel and Ross clearly endorse this viewpoint by 
acknowledging that “the law typically requires an objectively harmful 
act before sanctions are levied[]” and that “[b]ad intent by itself is not 
sufficient.”25  Nevertheless, they prefer to derive the definition of 
manipulation from the trader’s subjective intentions.  They argue that 
because prohibitions generally require clearly observable objective harm, 
while manipulation does not produce easily-observable, objective harm, 
the term “manipulation” should be defined subjectively.  Fischel and 
Ross’s reasoning, however, does not withstand careful scrutiny. 
If Fischel and Ross believe that prohibitions in general should merely 
cover behavior resulting in clearly observable objective harm, and that 
manipulation usually does not produce such harm, they should not have 
designed a new definition of manipulation.  Remarkably, they suggested 
an improved definition of manipulation that focused on the trader’s 
intent.  In addition, because Fischel and Ross considered observability of 
the objective harm to be essential, their suggested definition would be 
expected to emphasize the observability in some way.  They concluded, 
however, that the prohibition should preferably not rest on the 
unobservable objective harm, but instead on the unobservable intent of 
the trader.  This is an exchange of one unobservable element for another.  
Clearly, they have not succeeded in designing a prohibition on 
manipulation that incorporates the observability of the trader’s behavior. 
                                                        
25 See Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 519. 
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Furthermore, Fischel and Ross’s assumption that prohibitions should 
only cover behavior producing clearly observable objective harm is 
relative.  I agree that most prohibitions cover behavior that results in 
observable objective harm.  Indeed, by prohibiting only this kind of 
behavior, authorities would face fewer enforcement complexities, 
limiting the probability of Type I errors.  At the same time, however, 
prohibitions covering unobservable harm could contribute to shaping 
and changing norms and preferences,26 which may offset the costs of 
false convictions.  Moreover, authorities regularly enforce many other 
complex prohibitions, such as prohibitions on tax evasion and insider 
trading,27 or establish proof of the unobservable mens rea, such as 
“knowledge” or “willful.”  Proof of manipulation and its objective harm 
could largely depend on circumstantial evidence, just like proof of tax 
evasion, insider trading, or mens rea does.28 
B. The Structure of the Article 
A few questionable prohibitions and definitions of manipulation 
have been proposed by various legal scholars.  Given the shortcomings 
of these suggested definitions, the main purpose of this Article is to 
construct an alternative objective definition of manipulation, which takes 
into consideration the societal costs of trading.  The blueprint of a 
definition rests upon the behavior and consequences of manipulation.  
The first element, the actus reus, is straightforward.  A manipulator, like 
any other trader, executes one or more transactions.  Therefore, the 
consequences of the transactions are the distinguishing factor, in 
particular, the societal costs.  As will be shown, the core of manipulation 
can best be described as exercising unsupported price pressure because this 
creates societal costs.29 
                                                        
26 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill and Chaim Fershtman, Law and Preferences, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
331, 331-32 (2004); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Culture and Contempt: The Limitations of Expressive 
Criminal Law, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133, 133-34 (2003); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and 
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis 
of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 39 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1990). 
27 See, e.g., Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems 
of Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1421, n.1 (1991). 
28 Id. at 1454, 1466. 
29 I merely consider how transactions create societal costs and ignore the potential costs 
of enforcing such a prohibition on manipulation.  Nevertheless, one of the outcomes of the 
analysis is the introduction of a materiality standard, regulating the application of the 
prohibition and incorporating the costs of enforcement.  At the extreme end, the materiality 
standard could in fact obstruct the use of the prohibition. 
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The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows.  Section II is 
descriptive.  Section II.A.1 introduces a novel concept called price 
pressure, which extends the commonly used concept of price change.  
Section II.A.2 examines how one can exercise price pressure, and how 
price pressure explains price changes and shows that prohibitions could 
advantageously bypass the term price changes.  Section III develops an 
alternative standard for evaluating different forms of price pressure.  
Here the concern is normative.  Supported and unsupported price 
pressures are differentiated from one another.  As a result, a prohibition 
could be based on the unsupported price pressure-standard, allowing 
supported price pressure but barring unsupported price pressure. 
Section IV of this Article considers certain policy of existing 
prohibitions on manipulation.  The current prohibitions are not always 
compatible with the unsupported price pressure-standard and may be 
tailored to the requirements of the standard.  Furthermore, the 
prohibitions may be limited with a materiality standard, thereby taking 
into account the enforcement costs with regard to immaterial, 
unsupported price pressure.  Subsequently, the analysis sheds light on 
the longstanding debate concerning the possibility of designing an 
objective definition of manipulation and the specific role of the mens rea 
element.  Finally, Section V examines the application and extension of 
the unsupported price pressure-standard. 
II.  THE DESCRIPTIVE SIDE OF PRICE PRESSURE 
A. How to Define Price Pressure? 
Manipulation has both a descriptive and a normative side.  This 
Section analyzes manipulation from a descriptive perspective.  It 
explains what price pressure is, how it relates to price changes, and how 
the extent of the price pressure is determined.  According to economic 
theory, transactions have at least two effects.  Transactions sometimes 
directly influence prices, causing prices to change or stabilize.30  
Additionally, transactions always spread market information, which 
                                                        
30 See, e.g., Robert W. Holthausen & Robert W. Leftwich, The Effect of Large Block 
Transactions on Security Prices. A Cross-Sectional Analysis, J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1987); Myron S. 
Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of 
Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. L. 179 (1972); Alan Kraus & Hans R. Stoll, Price Impacts 
of Block Trading on the New York Stock Exchange, 27 J. FIN. 569 (1972).  Still, most transactions 
(95.9%) do not result in a price change or result in a small price change of 1/8 percent.  See 
Thel, supra note 7, at 224. 
Nelemans: Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
1178 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
traders use for their investment decisions.31  Market information 
sometimes indirectly influences prices.  Section II discusses the role that 
these transactions have regarding direct price influence.  Section V.B.1 
extends the analysis to transactions that spread market information and 
indirectly influence prices. 
1. The Definition of Price Pressure 
A preliminary issue is how the execution of transactions results in a 
price change.  Accordingly, the efficient market hypothesis provides a 
ready-to-use description.32  Corporations first disclose new information, 
traders then execute transactions, and the price finally adapts to the new 
information.  Since disclosed information drives transactions, 
information will be discounted in the price.  New information, however, 
is not a necessary condition for price changes.  Financial markets are, to a 
large extent, but not completely, efficient.  As a result, they leave room 
for traders who engage in large transactions to dry up or wash over 
liquidity, forcing the price up or down for some limited time. In such 
situations, no information is discounted in the price.  While it stands to 
reason that most traders have insufficient capital to cause price changes, 
large traders in liquid markets and small traders in illiquid markets will 
sometimes be able to inflate or deflate the price. 
To study manipulation, one should look at the individual 
contributions to the total price change, not at the collective effort to 
change prices.  This is an underexposed aspect explored in previous 
articles and in cases involving manipulation.  Quite often, the 
manipulator is simply held accountable for the total price change, even 
though such reasoning is not always justifiable.  Envision a market with 
one manipulator and two normal traders.  Each person buys stock in 
corporation ABC within a short interval, while the price of ABC shares 
rises from $10 to $15 synchronously.  The manipulator might be 
completely responsible for this price change, even though his 
                                                        
31 Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 AMER. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1980) (arguing that “the price system makes 
publicly available the information obtained by informed individuals to the uninformed.”).  
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 
549 (1984) (explaining how derivatively informed traders extract information from other 
traders). 
32 See, e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSPECT. 59 (2003); Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSPECT. 83 (2003); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS. AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000). 
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contribution might be negligible.  So, the challenge is to determine if, and 
to what extent, the manipulator and his subset of transactions has 
contributed to the price rise, and to what extent the other traders are 
responsible. 
In order to enable this appraisal, we can move away from the 
conventional definitions of manipulation, which normally concentrate on 
the execution of transactions and price changes.  This Article takes a 
different approach and focuses on the vital link between transactions 
and prices—the price pressure.  A trader first executes transactions, then 
exercises price pressure, and lastly influences the price.  Price pressure is 
defined as the contribution to the total price change. I prefer the term 
price pressure instead of contribution to the total price change, thereby 
making a clear distinction between the various forces that add up to the 
price change and the actual price change itself.  Price pressure is the 
independent or explanatory variable, while price change is the 
dependent variable.  According to this approach, the accumulation of all 
individual price pressure equals the price change. 
2. Price Pressure and the Price 
Most traders exercise no, or negligible, price pressure.  The category 
of traders exercising relevant price pressure is small.  To illustrate the 
idea of price pressure, consider the following model of a market with 
three traders (X, Y, and Z).  Each trader exercises relevant price pressure 
(X’, Y’, and Z’) within a certain interval.  The regulator suspects X of 
manipulation by exercising X’ and investigates how the three traders 
and their price pressure explain the price change, so that he will have a 
reliable estimate of the extent of X’.  The regulator first determines the 
pre-manipulation price at t.  He then estimates the values X’, Y’, and Z’ 
between t and t+i in order to explain the stock price at t+i.  The pre-
manipulation price at t and the post-manipulation price at t+i can be any 
positive number.  The values X’, Y’, and Z’ are positive for upward price 
pressure, negative for downward price pressure, and zero for no price 
pressure.  The relationship between the three types of price pressure and 
the total price change is depicted in the following equation: 
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In order to assess whether X is indeed a manipulator, the regulator 
should first determine X’ by using the step-by-step plan described in 
Section II.B, and then make a normative judgment about X’ on the basis 
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of the standard developed in Section III.  There are two approaches for 
estimating X’.  The first option is to assess X’ directly by deriving X’ 
from the price change.  The second is to estimate X’ by subtracting all 
other forms of price pressure from the price change.  Assume that X’, Y’, 
and Z’ are in fact +$5, -$3 and +$1, respectively, while the total price 
change is +$3.  The regulator will probably assess X’ directly.  
Nevertheless, he could also calculate X’ by subtracting Y’ and Z’ from 
the price change: (+$3) - (-$3) - (+$1) or (+$5).  The direct way is 
preferable as it is less convoluted and entails fewer arithmetic steps.  
Nevertheless, the indirect way might serve as an additional check, 
especially when Y’ and Z’ are easy to discover. 
The suspect will often contribute in some way to the price change.  
Sometimes, while he is not completely responsible for the price change, 
the suspected trader might have: (1) reinforced, (2) stabilized, or (3) 
created a price change.  The trader reinforces a price change when he 
brings about a price change that is larger than it would be without X’, 
stabilizes a price change when the price change is weaker than it would 
be without X’, and creates a price change when he is fully responsible for 
the complete price change.  For that reason, when a regulator suspects X 
of manipulating the price, because, for example, the regulator observes 
no price change or a large price change when he expects otherwise, he 
cannot decide the direction or the extent of X’ just by looking at the stock 
price behavior.33  If a regulator focuses on the stock price behavior 
instead of the price pressure, disregarding the subtle difference, chances 
are he will under- or over-estimate the extent of X’. 
B. How to Determine Price Pressure? 
The preceding analysis suggests that the regulator should determine 
the extent of the suspect’s price pressure.  In making the determination, 
the regulator should use the following sequence: first, approximate the 
extent by linking the suspect’s trading volume to the total price change; 
                                                        
33 Consider the following two situations.  In the first situation, a regulator believes that a 
manipulator has operated, and he observes no price change, where he expects otherwise.  
What is the size of X’? X’ could have been either downward or upward and either small or 
large.  X’ could have been -$0.1.  That is when the combination of Y’ and Z’ turns out to be 
+$0.1.  But X’ could just as well have been -$5, provided that the other forces add up to +$5.  
In the second situation, a regulator believes that a manipulator has operated, and he 
observes a price change of +$5, where he expects otherwise.  What is the size of X’?  X’ 
could have been either downward or upward and either small or large.  X’ could have been 
+$0.1.  That is when the combination of Y’ and Z’ turns out to be +$4.9.  However, X’ could 
just as well have been +$5, provided that Y’ and Z’ add up to $0. 
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second, polish the approximation by discounting the characteristics of 
the suspect’s transactions. 
1. Approximating the Suspect’s Price Pressure 
There is a simple formula to approximate the suspect’s price 
pressure: (‘the suspect’s trading volume’ / ‘the total trading volume’) * (‘Stock 
pricet+1’ – ‘Stock pricet’).  Consider the following two examples on how to 
apply the formula.34 
In the first situation, the suspect has bought 10,000 shares of ABC 
within the defined interval and the rest of the market has bought 5,000 
shares of ABC.  So, both the suspect and the rest of the market exercised 
upward price pressure.  Suppose that the stock price has increased from 
$10 to $12 within the defined interval.  We are now able to estimate the 
suspect’s price pressure, which by and large is (10,000 / (10,000 + 5,000)) 
* ($12 - $10) or +$1.33.  At the same time, the other market participants 
have exercised a price pressure as large as (5,000 / (10,000 + 5,000)) * ($12 
- $10) or +$0.66.  The price pressure of the suspect and the price pressure 
of the rest of the market add up to the price change of +$2. 
In the second situation, the suspect has bought 10,000 shares of ABC 
within the defined interval and the rest of the market has sold 5,000 
shares of ABC.  In this situation, the price pressure of the suspect and the 
rest of the market is in the opposite direction.  The suspect exercised 
upward price pressure and the rest of the market exercised downward 
price pressure.  Again, the stock price has increased from $10 to $12.  The 
suspect’s price pressure is (10,000 / (10,000 - 5,000)) * ($12 - $10) or +$4.  
The other market participants have exercised a price pressure of (-5,000 / 
(10,000 – 5,000)) * ($12 -$10) or -$2.  So, the suspect’s price pressure and 
the other price pressure add up to the price change of +$2. 
2. Polishing the Approximation 
Now that the regulator has an approximation of the suspect’s price 
pressure, he should polish the estimate.  The articles of Fischel & Ross 
                                                        
34 In case the price pressure of the suspect and the price pressure of the rest of the 
market are identical and contrary, so that the price completely stabilizes, the methodology 
changes. Imagine that the suspect’s and the market’s price pressure are +$5 and -$5, 
respectively.  It is impossible to calculate the suspect’s price pressure (+$5/0).  
Alternatively, the regulator should estimate what the price change would have been 
without the stabilizing transactions.  Because this situation is exceptional, it exceeds the scope 
of this Article and, therefore, it is not addressed herein. 
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and Thel make clear how a manipulator is able to build up price 
pressure.35  Transactions of significant volumes move the downward 
sloping demand curve,36 act on the liquidity of the market,37 and/or act 
on the bid-ask spread,38 thereby building up price pressure.  As a general 
rule, the larger the number, the size, and/or the density of the 
transactions, the larger the price pressure.  The regulator could use this 
insight to polish the approximation: if the suspect’s transactions were 
relatively more aggressive, that is if they were relatively more successful 
in moving the downward sloping demand curve, in acting on the 
liquidity of the market, and/or in acting on the bid-ask spread than the 
transactions of the rest of the market, the approximation of the suspect’s 
price pressure is on the low side and might be increased. 
                                                        
35 See Thel, supra note 7, at 227-47; Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 513-19.  These authors 
discussed how traders could use various mechanisms to cause price changes, like moving 
the downward sloping demand curve, acting on the liquidity of the market, and acting on 
the bid-ask spread.  Traders will use the same mechanisms in order to cause price pressure.  
The bid-ask bounce could be denoted as price pressure or price change, depending on the 
interval and the other forces in the market.  For convenience sake, I will treat it as price 
pressure.  The first two mechanisms result in an adjustment of the bid- and ask-price 
(external price pressure), while acting on the bid-ask spread causes price pressure between 
the bid- and ask-price (internal price pressure).  However, all three mechanisms are useful 
for building up real pressure. 
36 When the demand curve is downward sloping, a demand or supply shift would result 
in upward or downward pressure. In theory, each participant can exercise pressure 
through this mechanism.  There is empirical evidence for a downward sloping demand 
curve.  Howbeit, this particular mechanism will probably not be very effective for 
manipulation because the decline is fairly small.  See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Orly Sade & Avi 
Wohl, Measuring Stock Illiquidity: An Investigation of the Demand and Supply Schedules at the 
TASE, 74 J. FIN. ECON. 461 (2004); Jeffrey Wurgler & Ekaterina V. Zhuravskaya, Does 
Arbitrage Flatten Demand Curves for Stocks?, 75 J. BUS. 583 (2002); Aditya Kaul, Vikas 
Mehrotra & Randall Morck, Demand Curves for Stocks Do Slope Down: New Evidence from an 
Index Weights Adjustment, 55 J. FIN. 893 (2000). 
37 In case a market buy order is nearly as large as, or larger than, the accumulation of the 
pending sell orders (to be sold at the current market price), the market buy order dries the 
supply at the current market price and causes upward pressure.  The mirror image is a 
market sell order nearly as large as or larger than the accumulation of the pending buy 
orders (to be bought at the current market price).  The market sell order floods the demand 
at the current market price and causes downward pressure.  Each market participant could 
use this mechanism to exercise pressure.  The success depends on two variables: (1) the 
size, volume, and speed of the orders; and (2) the liquidity of the market. 
38 A trader is able to cause an uptick or a downtick and change the market price.  Let us 
assume that the bid price is $10 and the sell price is $11.  If the market price is $10 and the 
following trade is a purchase, the market price will bounce to $11 (uptick).  In case the 
market price is $11 and the next trade is a sale, the market price will bounce back to $10 
(downtick).  The pressure between the bid and asks price is limited to the size of the bid-
ask spread ($1). 
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III. THE NORMATIVE SIDE OF PRICE PRESSURE 
A. The “Unsupported Price Pressure” Standard 
Section II dealt with the relationship between transactions, price 
pressure, and price changes.  Trading behavior still needs a normative 
delineation.  The following analysis concentrates on the normative side 
of price pressure, showing that manipulation can be defined as 
“exercising unsupported price pressure.” 
1. Unsupported Price Pressure 
Government decision makers frequently fail to provide a clear and 
immediate cause to regulate manipulation.  According to one often used 
reason, they would have to control the deliberate interference with the 
free play of supply and demand in the security markets.39  Another 
reason for counteracting manipulation is the prevention of a loss of 
confidence in market operations.40  It could also be that manipulators are 
active and other market participants lose confidence.  Both claims, 
however, lack serious empirical proof.  Apart from that, even when 
government decision makers have compelling reasons to prohibit 
manipulation, they often design broad and general prohibitions, lacking 
a clear normative distinction between legal and illegal behavior.  Some 
definitions rest primarily on poorly defined effects of trading in order to 
delimit illegal behavior.41 Other definitions use intent to mark off the 
                                                        
39 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (“The idea of a free and open public market is built 
upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to a fair price of the 
security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just 
price.”); Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2001) 281 def., 3 (“Fair prices 
result from individual analysis by investors of all public information. Prices resulting from 
manipulation are set at another level, creating economic advantage solely for the 
manipulators, but damaging the interests of all other investors.”). 
40 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 10 (1934) (“To insure to the multitude of investors the 
maintenance of fair and honest markets, manipulative practices of all kinds on national 
exchanges are banned.”); Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2001) 281 def., 2 
(“Market abuse not only increases the cost for companies to finance themselves but also 
harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in securities and derivatives 
trading.”). 
41 See, e.g., Sec. Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b); Sec. Exchange Act of 1934, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003; Section 1041A CA 2001.  See supra  notes 10, 
11, 14 and 18 (providing the full text of the provisions).  The US provisions apply to “any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance’ and ‘any act . . . which operates . . .  as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person.”  The European definition covers trades creating an 
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supposed harmful behavior.42  In this way, the regulator exercises large 
discretionary powers to regulate the market, which may deter market 
participants from executing trades that would otherwise enhance 
welfare.  These prohibitions are not completely inadequate, but there is 
an opportunity to narrow the prohibitions, communicating clearly to the 
market what kind of behavior is illegal. 
Few forms of trading result in societal costs.  These trades qualify as 
manipulative.  Trades not resulting in societal costs are exempted.  But, 
when might trading bring about societal costs?  One of the differences 
between a manipulator and a “normal” trader is the quality of the price 
pressure.  Just as information differs in quality, price pressure can be of 
high or low quality.43  I will use the term “unsupported price pressure” 
for low-quality price pressure.  A trader exercises unsupported price 
pressure when he lacks sufficient information to justify the price 
pressure.  Logically, I will use the term “supported price pressure” for 
high-quality price pressure.  Traders exercise supported price pressure 
when they have sufficient information to justify their price pressure.  
Unsupported price pressure might create societal costs, because the price 
impact is partially or completely unfounded.  Conversely, it is 
reasonable to assume that supported price pressure does not result in 
societal costs, because this trading contributes to the efficiency of prices.  
Therefore, manipulation presupposes unsupported price pressure, which 
is a necessary condition. 
If a regulator investigates a suspect, he needs at least compelling 
evidence that the suspect possessed insufficient information.  The 
support of the price pressure should be derived from two variables: (1) 
the extent of the price pressure and (2) the extent of the justifiable price 
pressure.  If the trader’s price pressure is larger than the justifiable price 
pressure, he produces unsupported price pressure.  The trader’s price 
pressure minus the justified price pressure equals the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure.  Otherwise, if the trader’s price pressure is 
                                                                                                                            
artificial or abnormal price, while the Australian definition is limited to trades resulting in an 
artificial price. 
42 See, e.g., § 9(a)(2) of the Sec. Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2000).  This 
Section applies to trading, whether or not resulting in a price change, if it is for the purpose 
of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others; see also the definition proposed 
by Fischel and Ross, requiring bad intent. 
43 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).  Akerlof’s seminal paper on the market for lemons 
shows that the production of low-quality information might result in societal costs.  In the 
same way low-quality price pressure can be costly and be a reason for regulation. 
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equal to, or less than, the justifiable price pressure, he produces 
supported price pressure. 
Imagine a trader who executes transactions and causes price 
pressure as large as +$5.  He exercises: (1) unsupported price pressure 
when his underlying information justifies, e.g. a price pressure of $0; (2) 
partly supported price pressure (+$3) and partly unsupported price 
pressure (+$2) when his underlying information justifies a price pressure 
of +$3; or (3) supported price pressure when his information justifies a 
price pressure of +$5 or +$8.  A trader, who exercises price pressure as 
large as the justified price pressure, loses his complete information 
privilege; while a trader, who exercises price pressure smaller than the 
justified price pressure, protects at least a part of his information.  The 
foregoing is depicted in the following three equations: 
(1)  trader’s price pressure > justifiable price pressure ? 
unsupported price pressure 
(2)  trader’s price pressure = justifiable price pressure ? 
supported price pressure 
(3)  trader’s price pressure < justifiable price pressure ? 
supported price pressure 
The proposed approach to distinguish between manipulators and 
“normal” traders relates to the empirical approach to make this 
distinction.  The empirical analysis of manipulation by measuring 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (“CAR”) is based on the following 
reasoning.  If supposed manipulators have inflated the price and the 
price remains high over time, the traders were most likely informed and 
not manipulative.  Conversely, if the price drops, the traders were most 
likely manipulators.  The proposed standard concentrates on the 
manipulator exercising unsupported price pressure, while the CAR 
standard centers on arbitrageurs removing a created mispricing.  
Obviously, the legal definition of manipulation should be based on the 
proposed standard and not on the CAR standard, simply because the 
legal definition ought to focus on the suspect’s behavior, whereas the 
empirical approach covers the arbitrageur’s behavior.  The following 
example illustrates the difference between the “unsupported price 
pressure” standard and the CAR standard. 
Envision an informed trader who has information that points to 
future price pressure of +$3 and exercises direct supported price pressure 
of +$3 at t.  Fifty traders observe this behavior and follow suit.  Each 
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trader exercises indirect unsupported price pressure of +$0.04 at t+1.  In 
this situation arbitrageurs do not reverse the +$3 contribution of the 
informed trader.  On the other hand, they will remove the +$2 
contribution of the other traders.  Even though the informed trader 
exercised supported price pressure, the analysis shows some CAR due to 
removal of the overreaction.  Under the proposed standard, the informed 
trader is no manipulator.  Conversely, according to the CAR standard, 
the informed trader may qualify as a manipulator.  It is important to note 
that a trader who exercises supported price pressure is not responsible 
for causing indirect unsupported price pressure.  Furthermore, the 
individuals are not blamed, as each exercised irrelevant unsupported 
price pressure. 
2. Factual Assessment 
The procedure to determine whether a suspect has exercised 
unsupported price pressure includes the following steps.  The regulator 
approximates the suspect’s price pressure based on the trading volumes, 
and polishes the estimate by taking into account the characteristics of the 
suspected transactions.  The regulator then evaluates the suspect’s 
information position at the moment of trading.  Having translated this 
information position into the justifiable price pressure, he can decide 
whether the suspect has exercised unsupported price pressure or not.  In 
principle, the discovery of the information position requires hard 
evidence.  Also, the conversion of the information position to the 
justified price pressure asks for an adequate and consistent 
argumentation.  However, how can a regulator apply the “unsupported 
price pressure” standard in practice?  The next paragraphs define the 
concepts of “information” and “non-information.”  They further describe 
the method to discover the suspect’s information position and the way to 
translate the information position into the extent of the justified price 
pressure. 
The application of the “unsupported price pressure” standard 
depends in large part on the delineation of the concept “information.”  
Henceforth, “information” is all information that points to: (1) an 
undervaluation or overvaluation of certain shares; or (2) a change of the 
fundamental value of certain shares.  If shares of ABC are trading at $18, 
and the trader has information that their fundamental value is $20, the 
shares are undervalued and the trader is allowed to exercise price 
pressure between $0 and +$2.  On the other hand, a trader could have 
information that points to a change of the fundamental value of certain 
shares.  For example, a trader is the first to know that company ABC will 
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lose its successful CEO, probably decreasing the fundamental value of 
the shares with -$1.  In this situation, the trader is allowed to exercise 
price pressure between $0 and -$1.44  It is important to note that the 
trader can legitimately move the price away from the fundamental value 
as long as he exercises supported price pressure.  The trader could 
legitimately sell shares and move the price from $18 to $17, even when 
the fundamental value of the shares is $20, because he discounts new 
information in the stock price. 
Another important aspect of the “unsupported price pressure” 
standard is the distinction between “information” and “non-
information.”  Consider the following three situations.  First, traders 
sometimes believe they have information that is not yet discounted in 
the stock price, while in fact it has been discounted in the stock price.  
Second, traders sometimes receive information, which is discounted in 
the stock price shortly after.  In both situations, the trader has no 
information and is not allowed to exercise price pressure.  Third, two 
traders could receive identical information at t, after which they both 
exercise price pressure at t+1.  If the traders receive information pointing 
at future supported price pressure of +$2, their combined price pressure 
should be +$2 or less.  The more the information ages, the smaller the 
justified price pressure.  So, traders should keep in mind whether their 
information by any chance ages and becomes non-information, 
influencing the extent of justified price pressure. 
How does the regulator then discover the information position?  In 
theory, the regulator should determine what kind of information 
circulated within the complete market, in all states of the world, and what 
information has reached the suspect.  Obviously, the regulator is hardly 
able to assess the suspect’s information position at the moment of 
trading.45  Certainly, he is faced with a formidable task.  Hence, he will 
have to gather a lot of soft evidence about the probability of an 
insufficient information position, most likely deriving an estimate of the 
                                                        
44 This trader could of course violate the prohibition on insider trading.  Nevertheless, a 
trader discounting inside information into the stock price contributes to efficiency and 
cannot be qualified as a manipulator. 
45 See Yadlin, supra note 3, at 849 (“Thus, very rarely will a fact-finder be able to 
determine whether or not a particular scheme was based on information.”).  Indeed, we 
know from the enforcement of insider trading laws that the suspect’s information position 
is hard to prove.  The regulator should determine what kind of information circulated 
within the company and what information might have reached the insider.  He could, for 
example, use minutes from corporate meetings, reconstructing the information position of 
the insider. 
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supposed information position from the characteristics of the trades and 
the interests of the trader, an approach that includes a high risk of Type I 
errors.  There are situations in which a regulator is not able to determine 
the suspect’s information position, although he is able to conclude that 
the suspect’s information position was most likely insufficient to justify 
the exercised price pressure.  For example, this occurs where a market 
participant causes an exceptional price increase of at least ten percent or 
where a market participant shows extraordinary behavior that goes with 
a significant expected profit. 
In case the regulator is able to derive the suspect’s information 
position, the next step is the conversion of the suspect’s information 
position into the justified price pressure.  A regulator has to provide a 
well-argued estimate of justified price pressure, in the absence of a 
definite algorithm to calculate this value.  A weak information position 
justifies small price pressure, just as a strong information position 
justifies a large price pressure.  If an uninformed trader merely wants to 
gamble, having no relevant information, the extent of the justified price 
pressure is $0.  If, however, an insider knows that the price is going to 
rise, the justified price pressure is relatively large.  People may find the 
analysis of the information position and the conversion of the 
information position problematic.  As already stated, the regulator is 
often not able to determine the precise extent of the unsupported price 
pressure, although he has opportunities to legitimately conclude that a 
trader most likely has exercised unsupported price pressure. 
3. Some Improvements 
This Article is based on the dichotomy of supported and 
unsupported price pressure.  The difference lies in the quality of the 
price pressure.  Most other papers distinguish between informed traders 
and uninformed traders who cause a price change.  One should not 
confuse both approaches.  First, the proposed standard clearly isolates 
price pressure from noticeable price change.  In this way, the focus is on 
the contribution of the suspect and not on the outcome of the market.  
Second, the standard is applicable to assess both uninformed traders, 
who exercise price pressure, and informed traders, who exercise more 
price pressure than justified price pressure.  Finally, the standard allows 
us to determine the extent of the unsupported price pressure, because it 
distinguishes between exercised and justified price pressure.  
Consequently, it is possible to introduce a materiality standard.  Let us 
now examine the differences between the “unsupported price pressure” 
standard and a few other standards put forward in the past. 
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Yadlin46 and Easterbrook47 point out that manipulation relates to the 
trader’s information position.  Accordingly, a trader, who produces a 
price change while he has no information, might be a manipulator.  Even 
though this approach has its merit, it is not explicit.  The authors ignore 
the difference between price change and price pressure, making it hard 
to determine the extent of the price pressure.  Moreover, they focus on 
uninformed traders who influence the price, ignoring informed traders 
who exercise unsupported price pressure.  Their approach is sufficient 
when a trader was partially or completely responsible for a price change, 
while being uninformed at the moment of trading.  However, the 
approach is insufficient when the same trader was in possession of an 
information set.  In that case, one should first determine the extent of the 
exercised and justified price pressure before being able to judge the 
quality of the price pressure.  In addition, when a trader has exercised 
unsupported price pressure, both the exercised and the justified price 
pressure are necessary to determine the extent of the unsupported price 
pressure. 
The papers of Gastineau & Jarrow48 and Fischel & Ross49 linked 
manipulation with uninformed profits.  Again, this approach has merit, 
although one should develop the idea so that it may be implemented.  
For this purpose, the standard of unsupported price pressure is relevant.  
The following example illustrates why the extent of the exercised and 
justified price pressure are essential to estimate the uninformed profit.  
Consider a trader who possesses some information, knowing that the 
price of ABC shares will rise from $20 to $23.  Next assume that this 
trader buys 1,000 shares of ABC and causes a price rise from $20 to $25 
per share.  Since the trader’s justified price pressure is +$3 and the 
trader’s exercised price pressure is +$5, the supported price pressure is 
                                                        
46 Id. at 842 (“I distinguish between informed and uninformed manipulators.  Both types 
of manipulators trade for the purpose of affecting the market price.  But informed 
manipulators are privy to information that leads them to believe that the market has 
mispriced the stock and that their effect on the market will better reflect the stock’s 
value.”). 
47 Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, J. 
BUS. L. 103, 118 (1986) (“The essential distinction is between secret strategies necessary to 
capture the value of new information about underlying conditions and secrecy designed to 
cause prices to diverge from those that reflect the underlying conditions.”). 
48 Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 41 (“[I]n the absence of information that suggests a 
trading strategy will yield a positive, risk-adjusted return . . . , the trader undertakes it 
anyway, expecting to profit from advantages related to size and intertemporal differences 
in market impact.”). 
49 Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“[T]he resulting profit comes solely from the 
trader’s ability to move prices and not from his possession of valuable information.”). 
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+$3 and the unsupported price pressure is +$2.  This is sufficient to 
determine both the extent of the informed and uninformed profit.  
Assume that the trader exercises the aforementioned price pressure right 
after he has signed a contract with another party to sell 100,000 shares of 
ABC in a person-to-person deal, while the implicit and explicit costs of 
exercising the price pressure are negligible.  Under these circumstances, 
he would have been able to reap an informed profit of $300,000 and an 
uninformed profit of $200,000, both on the contractual sale. 
B. The Costs of Unsupported Price Pressure 
The preceding Section illustrates why manipulation should be 
defined as “exercising unsupported price pressure.”  This Section 
explores the dynamics of unsupported price pressure.  Unsupported 
price pressure causes welfare shifts between uninformed traders on the 
one hand, and corrective traders or manipulators on the other.  These 
welfare shifts might drive away uninformed traders from the financial 
markets, resulting in reduced liquidity and societal costs.  The following 
analysis explains that a prohibition of manipulation, which is in line with 
the “unsupported price pressure” standard, could discourage 
unsupported price pressure and, as such, increase social welfare. 
1. The Framework 
A model is used to analyze effects of idealized market transactions.  
The model includes four archetypical traders: (1) a manipulator; (2) a 
corrective trader; (3) an informed trader; and (4) an uninformed trader.  I 
will give a short description of each of the traders and the quality of their 
price pressure. 
In a standard manipulation scheme, the manipulator exercises 
upward unsupported price pressure to raise the price, thereby creating an 
informational privilege.  The manipulator’s exclusive knowledge that the 
price is too high gives him an advantage over the other market 
participants.  The manipulator then sells a large amount of shares at the 
inflated price, using his informational privilege.  He will try to avoid or 
limit the exercise of downward supported price pressure, since he would 
otherwise discount information in the price and lose his informational 
privilege.  A successful avoidance results in a profit. 
Corrective traders compete with a manipulator from the moment he 
has exercised upward unsupported price pressure.  Their only goal is to 
discover manipulators and sell shares at the inflated price, thereby trying 
to minimize the exercise of downward supported price pressure and 
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maximize their profit.  Informed traders are the first to receive new 
information about the future of the company or market, and will trade 
shares before other traders will be in the position to do so.  They, 
however, do not react to manipulators and manipulative schemes.  
Informed traders endeavor to minimize the supported price pressure and 
maximize their profit. 
Uninformed traders do not have any information about the future of 
the company or market, but still trade on a regular basis for various 
reasons, for example, the investment of capital or the transfer of risk.50  
The uninformed traders limit the size of their transactions and do not 
create any relevant price pressure.  They will sometimes trade with other 
uninformed traders and sometimes with the manipulator, corrective 
traders, or informed traders.  The uninformed traders, on average, play 
even when they trade with each other.  Otherwise, they will lose. 
The formalization is as follows.  The pre- and post-manipulation 
price at t and t+i can be any positive number.  The model distinguishes 
between a manipulator exercising upward unsupported price pressure 
(M) and downward supported price pressure (O).  A manipulator first 
exercises M, raising the price before he unloads his shares at the inflated 
price, and possibly exercises O.  Furthermore, corrective traders exercise 
downward supported price pressure (C), informed traders exercise either 
downward or upward price pressure (I), and uninformed traders 
exercise no or negligible price pressure (U).  M, O, C, I, and U are either 
positive for upward price pressure, negative for downward price 
pressure, or zero for no price pressure.  The relation is depicted in the 
following equation: 
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M, I, and U start at t+1, while O and C will not start before t+2.  As a 
rule, if M is positive, O and C are negative, and vice versa.  It is 
important to note that mt+1 is always larger than or equal to ot+2 and ct+2, 
while mt+1 can be smaller than ot+3 and ct+3.  The sum of mt+1, mt+2, ot+2, and 
ct+2 determines the maximum of ot+3 and ct+3.  The larger mt+1 and mt+2 and 
the smaller ot+2 and ct+2, the larger ot+3 and ct+3.  This relation is depicted 
in the following equation: 
                                                        
50 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at 176-200. 
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2. The Analysis 
The main question is to what extent a manipulator, defined as a 
trader who exercises unsupported price pressure, creates societal costs.  
The goal is to examine the most relevant potential costs, not to cover all 
conceivable costs.  A manipulator executes either one-sided trades or 
two-sided trades.  In the case of one-sided trades, he only buys shares 
and exercises upward unsupported price pressure.  So, the manipulator 
exercises M, but not O.  In case of two-sided trades, the manipulator first 
buys shares, exercising upward unsupported price pressure, and then 
sells shares to take advantage of the unsupported price pressure.  The 
manipulator exercises M and possibly O.  Both one-sided and two-sided 
trades cause welfare shifts between uninformed traders and corrective 
traders.  In the case of two-sided trades, the manipulator further sells 
shares at the inflated price and benefits at the expense of uninformed 
traders, provided that he minimizes O.  All these welfare shifts might 
drive away uninformed traders from the financial markets, resulting in 
reduced liquidity and societal costs.  The relation between unsupported 
price pressure and societal costs will be discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
a. One-sided Trades and Welfare Shifts 
Few manipulators buy shares and exercise upward unsupported 
price pressure without selling shares to take advantage of the 
unsupported price pressure.  It is costly to create unsupported price 
pressure and, therefore, taking a profit, by unloading a large number of 
shares at the inflated price, is the rational outcome.  Nevertheless, there 
will always be some manipulators who miss their trading opportunity.  
One can think of several scenarios in which this occurs.  First, a 
manipulator who has exercised unsupported price pressure, and initially 
is in the position to make a profit by unloading a large amount of shares, 
may pull back because the opportunity disappears quickly or the scheme 
appears to be too risky or too transparent.  Second, a trader who 
exercises unsupported price pressure may be unaware that he actually 
did so and consequently will not think of unloading shares at the 
inflated price.  Such an ignorant trader might qualify as a manipulator, 
especially when his ignorance is reprehensible and the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure is large.  Notwithstanding the cause of one-
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sided trades, the trader produces: (1) extra volatility and (2) extra 
information asymmetries.  We will discuss both of these effects. 
i. Extra Volatility 
Adding volatility to the market has its own welfare effects.  A 
manipulator will either increase or decrease the risk of a single stock.  If 
unsupported price pressure results in extra volatility, it increases the 
risk.  Conversely, if unsupported price pressure mitigates the price 
variance, it decreases the risk.51  There are three relevant situations.  
First, the manipulator exercises upward M, while there is no other price 
pressure, thereby causing volatility by definition.  Second, upward M is 
in line with the accumulation of C and I. For example, M is +$2, while C is 
+$3 and I is -$1.  In this situation, the manipulator increases volatility.  
Third, upward M is contrary to the accumulation of C and I.  For 
example, M is +$2, while C is -$3 and I is -$1.  The manipulator mitigates 
the volatility; however, he does this temporarily.  The manipulator will 
shortly afterward exercise O or induce corrective traders to exercise C, 
increasing volatility.  Therefore, the conclusion is that on average a 
manipulator raises volatility. 
ii. Costs of extra volatility 
What happens after a manipulator has exercised M?  Traders who 
buy at an inflated price transfer wealth to investors who sell at an 
inflated price.  This is not automatically a problem.  A manipulator will 
not create costs to risk neutral traders if they are as likely to lose from 
buying at a deflated price as they are to gain from selling at an inflated 
price.  Further, the manipulator will not thwart risk-averse traders, 
provided that they have a well-diversified stock portfolio.  According to 
modern portfolio theory, investors with a well-diversified portfolio are 
able to exclude unsystematic risk, which is risk associated with 
individual assets.  Nevertheless, a manipulator creates costs to risk-
averse traders with a poorly diversified portfolio.  Hence, the 
manipulator causes extra volatility and drives away this group of traders 
from the financial markets.  The reduction in liquidity could result in 
societal costs.52 
                                                        
51 Cf. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 
DUKE L.J. 977, 1026 (1992). 
52 Unsupported price pressure might have an influence on the size of the bid-ask spread, 
because liquidity providers discount the stock price volatility and the extra risk.  See Hans 
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iii. Extra information asymmetries 
A manipulator does not create only extra volatility, but also extra 
information asymmetries.  Indeed, a manipulator inflates the stock price 
and consequently creates information asymmetries between himself and 
the uninformed market segment.  The idea that a manipulator establishes 
an informational advantage is straightforward.  Consider a manipulator 
who exercises upward M of +$5 while there are no other forms of price 
pressure, thereby slowly inflating the price from $10 to $15.  The 
manipulator has created an informational advantage: he knows that his 
own activities are the source of the price rise, while the uninformed 
market segment lacks this information.  Even though the manipulator 
endeavors to protect his information privilege as long as possible, he 
cannot prevent that some corrective traders in the end will receive a 
comparable informational privilege, especially when he is not able to 
fully camouflage his identity. 
iv. Costs of extra information asymmetries 
What happens after a manipulator has exercised M?  As the 
manipulator buys shares at a price above the fundamental value to 
exercise unsupported price pressure, he attracts relatively more 
corrective traders than uninformed traders.  Thus, comparatively 
speaking, a manipulator buys more shares from corrective traders than 
from uninformed traders, benefiting the corrective traders more than the 
uninformed traders.  If the manipulator, after having exercised 
unsupported price pressure, does not unload a large amount of shares, 
corrective traders replace the manipulator, selling shares to the 
uninformed traders at the inflated price until the price returns to the 
original level.  The conclusion is that a manipulator creates extra 
information asymmetries and benefits corrective traders vis-à-vis 
uninformed traders.  As a result, they drive away uninformed traders 
from the financial markets.  The reduced liquidity may again result in 
societal costs.53 
                                                                                                                            
R. Stoll, Market Microstructure, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: VOL. 1A, 
CORPORATE FINANCE 562-63 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz 
eds., 2003). 
53 Informational asymmetries are an explanation for the size of the bid-ask spread.  Id. at 
563.  Because information asymmetries increase the bid-ask spread, some traders might 
leave the market and reduce the liquidity. 
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b. Two-sided Trades and Welfare Shifts 
Most manipulators execute both buy and sell transactions to make a 
profit.  The question is to what extent two-sided trades create societal 
costs.  The analysis is limited to a manipulator who first purchases 
shares to inflate the price and then sells shares to profit from the inflated 
price.  This will either lead to symmetric or asymmetric price pressure.  
Envision a manipulator who purchases 1,000 shares and inflates the price 
from $10 to $15, while there are no other forms of price pressure.  When 
he sells 1,000 shares and the price returns to $10, it is a case of symmetric 
price pressure.  On the other hand, if he sells more than 1,000 shares 
before the price returns to $10, it is a situation of asymmetric price 
pressure.  The analysis ignores manipulators who create symmetric price 
pressure, as they will not make any profit and do not produce any other 
costs than already discussed.  Let us distinguish between a manipulator 
who exercises asymmetric price pressure: (1) in the same financial 
market and (2) in different financial markets.  We will discuss how 
traders can make a profit and if this results in societal costs. 
i. Two-sided trades in the same market 
The manipulator first buys shares, creating large upward 
unsupported price pressure, and then sells shares, creating little 
downward supported price pressure. Imagine the following example.  A 
manipulator buys 5,000 shares and exercises upward M of +$1, 
whereupon he sells 10,000 shares and exercises downward O of -$1.  
Obviously, the upward price pressure exceeds the downward price 
pressure.  For expositional clarity, we assume that the manipulator pays 
on average, an extra 0.55M per share and receives an extra -0.45O per 
share, that is, he pays an extra $0.55 per share and receives an extra $0.45 
per share.54  The manipulator will face a payout of (-$0.55 * 5,000) + 
($0.45 * 10,000) or $1750.  If the manipulator competes with corrective 
traders, his payout will be (-$0.55 * 5,000) + ((1-x) * $0.55 * 10,000), where 
(1-x) is a measure of the power to capitalize M. 
                                                        
54 This assumption is based on the following example.  The price and the fundamental 
value of a share is $5.  A trader, for example, buys 500 shares at $5.1, 500 shares at $5.2, 500 
shares at $5.3, and so on until the price reaches $6.  He will then sell 1,000 shares at $5.9, 
1,000 shares at $5.8, 1,000 shares at $5.7 and so on until the price reaches $5.  Cf. HARRIS, 
supra note 7, at 270-73. 
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ii. The likelihood of societal costs 
In theory, a manipulator is able to make a profit at the expense of 
uninformed traders.  This could drive away uninformed traders from the 
financial markets, reducing market liquidity and creating societal costs.  
It remains to be seen whether manipulators in practice are able to make a 
profit.  According to the cogent analysis of Fischel and Ross, making a 
profit may be unlikely.  In practice, M is usually counterbalanced by O.55  
Even though Thel largely endorses the principle that profitable 
manipulation is difficult, he rightly points out the importance of under 
and overreactions.56  Nevertheless, as long as empirical research has not 
produced profound insights in the causes and circumstances of these 
mixed reactions, it is hard to draw any conclusions about market reforms 
or regulation.  The idea that manipulators cannot systematically reap 
profits through contrary trades in the same market is supported by 
recent empirical studies on the information content of suspected trades.  
These studies show that many so-called manipulative transactions were 
probably informed trades.57  However, there is also evidence that pump 
and dump schemes might occur and be profitable.58  Considering the 
mixed evidence, it is best to conclude that there is not enough proof of 
manipulative profits and, therefore, societal costs. 
iii. Two-sided trades in different markets 
The Article started with an example of a trader who combines 
trading on the exchange, and deal making outside the exchange.  If the 
manipulator buys 5,000 shares of ABC on the exchange and exercises M 
of +$1, while contractual rights allow him to sell one million shares off 
the exchange at the inflated price, he is able to make a profit.  This is true 
as long the trader minimizes the costs of exercising M and keeps O at a 
minimum.  Again, we assume that the manipulator pays on average an 
extra 0.55M per share.  However, since he sells shares in a person-to-
person deal, he does not cause any O during the sale.  Under these 
circumstances and assumptions, the manipulator makes a profit of (-
$0.55 * 5,000) + ($1 * 1 million) or $997,250.  The trader has to consider 
                                                        
55 Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 517-19. 
56 Thel, supra note 7, at 261-67. 
57 Jiang, Mahoney & Mei, supra note 8, at 147; see also Mahoney, supra note 8, at 343 
(finding no evidence that stock pools were engaged in unsupported manipulation). 
58 See, e.g., Asim I. Khwaja & Atif Mian, Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in an 
Emerging Stock Market, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 203 (2005); see also Aggerwal & Wu, supra note 2, at 
1916. 
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the influence of corrective traders. If the manipulator inflates the price of 
ABC shares and corrective traders deflate the price before the 
manipulator is able to capitalize M, his payout will be (-$0.55 * 5,000) + 
((1-x) * $1 * 1 million), where (1-x) is a measure of the power to capitalize 
M.  In a similar way, the trader could combine trading on different 
exchanges.  He might trade ABC shares close to the expiration date of 
ABC options to influence the price of the latter and, therefore, make a 
profit. 
iv. The likelihood of societal costs 
It is reasonable to believe that manipulators in practice are able to 
make a profit by trading in different markets: buying in a market where 
prices are dynamic and selling in a market where prices are static.  As 
the manipulator makes a profit, the uninformed market incurs a loss.  
Consequently, the manipulator might drive away uninformed traders 
and reduce liquidity, creating some societal costs.59  Fischel and Ross, as 
well as Thel and Yadlin, have described several real-life situations and 
case law in which manipulators may have benefited.60  The authors agree 
that manipulation is occasionally profitable.  According to Fischel and 
Ross, contract-based manipulation is “not clearly self-deterring because 
the gains from triggering the contractual right could outweigh the losses 
incurred by the alleged manipulator at the time of sale.”61  Thel 
concludes that “contracts in which rights are contingent upon reported 
security prices create tempting opportunities for manipulation.”62  
Likewise, Yadlin believes “there are circumstances in which 
manipulation is profitable.”63  Overseeing the real-life situations and case 
law, it is plausible that manipulators sometimes make a profit and 
therefore cause societal costs. 
The objective of the foregoing discussion was to show that a trader 
who exercises unsupported price pressure may create societal costs, even 
when he does not profit from trading.  Thus a prohibition on 
                                                        
59 Since I aim to define manipulation and not to discuss the justification of regulation, I 
will ignore the fact that they disagree about the necessary policy implications.  Fischel and 
Ross argue that the societal costs of regulation are high, making the solution worse than the 
problem.  Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 553.  Thel believes that regulation will have a 
necessary deterrent effect.  See Thel, supra note 7, at 296-98. 
60 Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 527-34; see also Thel, supra note 7, at 247-61. 
61 Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 523. 
62 Thel, supra note 7, at 261. 
63 Yadlin, supra note 3, at 841. 
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manipulation may discourage unsupported price pressure, and as such 
increase social welfare. 
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
A. The Definition of Manipulation 
Having introduced an improved definition of manipulation, 
“exercising unsupported price pressure,” the focus is on some 
contemporary thoughts about prohibitions on manipulation.  The first 
policy implication is the design of future prohibitions on manipulation.  
The second policy implication is accentuating current prohibitions on 
manipulation by using the “unsupported price pressure” standard. 
1. Future Prohibitions 
At some stage, legislators in countries without a prohibition on 
manipulation in place or in countries with an intention to change 
existing prohibitions may want to explore the various options to design 
or change their existing statutes.  I do not claim that countries should 
expand their legal systems with a prohibition, but if they prefer to do so, 
they should design policy in line with the “unsupported price pressure” 
standard.  The most elementary prohibition bans traders who execute 
transactions that result in unsupported price pressure.  The legislator 
then has to decide if and how it wants to restrict the application of the 
prohibition.  It could opt for: (1) a restricted prohibition, indemnifying 
traders who exercise unsupported price pressure and do not expect to 
benefit (as discussed below); (2) a materiality standard, excluding minor 
forms of unsupported price pressure (Section IV.B); and/or (3) a mens rea 
element, excluding traders who can be declared innocent (Section IV.C). 
A legislator has to choose between a broad and a restricted 
prohibition.  The broad prohibition includes all traders who exercise 
unsupported price pressure.  The core of the prohibition would be as 
follows: it is prohibited to execute transactions that result in unsupported price 
pressure.  The restricted prohibition excludes traders who exercise 
unsupported price pressure and do not expect to benefit.  The core of the 
prohibition would provide: it is prohibited to execute transactions that result 
in unsupported price pressure and go together with an expected unsupported 
profit.  The advantage of the broad prohibition is that it applies to traders 
who exercise large unsupported price pressure and create significant 
societal costs, even if they are not in the position to make a profit (Section 
III.B.2.a).  Because of this advantage, it is reasonable to believe that 
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legislators will opt for a broad prohibition.  The remainder of this Article 
is based on this assumption. 
2. Contemporary Prohibitions 
The next question is how legislators can accentuate Section 10(b) of 
the SEA, Rule 10b-5, Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA, Section 1(2)(a) DMA 
2003, and Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003.  Section 10(b) of the SEA and Rule 
10b-5 applies to “any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” 
and “any act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person.”64  Both provisions could be more focused in the context of 
manipulation.  If the regulator interprets the provisions in line with the 
“unsupported price pressure” standard, he would clearly communicate 
to the market that traders are allowed to influence the stock price as long 
as they discount new information in the price and exercise supported 
price pressure.  So, a trader would only violate Section 10(b) of the SEA 
or Rule 10b-5 if he at least exercises unsupported price pressure.  
Besides, the regulator could take into account the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure and the culpability.  Consequently, traders 
do not have to err on the side of caution and are encouraged to enter into 
welfare-enhancing transactions. 
Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA refers to transactions raising or depressing 
the price of a security.65  A first shortcoming of the prohibition is that it 
applies to both transactions resulting in unsupported price pressure and 
supported price pressure.  If a trader executes transactions, exercises 
supported price pressure, and causes the price to change, he technically 
violates the prohibition.  Even though the prohibition is pretty broad at 
face value, it should be interpreted narrowly.66  For example, the court in 
Trane Co. v. O’Connor Securities concluded that a risk arbitrageur was 
allowed to cause a price change, because O’Connor “was convinced that 
Trane was a ready target for unusual corporate activity in the form of a 
                                                        
64 See supra notes 10, 11 for a more complete text of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 
respectively. 
65 See Thel, supra note 7, at 221 n.17 (referring to “buying a security for the purpose of 
increasing the reported price or selling a security for the purpose of decreasing the 
reported price”). 
66 H.R. REP. NO. 792, at 20 (1934) (“Of course, any extensive purchases or sales are bound 
to cause changes in the market price of the security.  If a person is merely trying to acquire 
a large block . . . or desires to dispose of a big holding, his knowledge that in doing so he 
will affect the market price does not make his action unlawful”); cf. S. REP. NO. 792, at 17 
(1934). 
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merger, take over or tender offer.”67  Even though the application of 
Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA is limited through case law, this has not 
established a crystal clear distinction between supported and 
unsupported price pressure.  One recommendation would be to restrict 
the application of the prohibition to traders who exercise unsupported 
price pressure. 
A second shortcoming of Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA is that it only 
applies to traders who create or reinforce a price change and not to traders 
who stabilize the price or mitigate price changes.  Consider a trader 
exercising upward unsupported price pressure of +$1, while the rest of 
the market exercises downward price pressure of -$1 respectively -$2.  
The trader does not raise or depress the price, but stabilizes the price and 
respectively mitigates the price change.  If Section 9(a)(2) of the SEA is 
replaced with the “unsupported price pressure” standard, it would 
clearly cover transactions that raise or depress the price and transactions 
that stabilize the price or mitigate price changes.  Section 9(a)(2) of the 
SEA could also be interpreted in line with the proposed standard, so that 
the provision is applicable to all traders who exercise unsupported price 
pressure, irrespective of the price influence.  Anyhow, I prefer a 
replacement, as an extensive interpretation would be rather forced. 
Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 applies to traders who execute transactions 
and bring the price to an abnormal level.  The prohibition does not 
define “abnormal level” and there is no relevant secondary legislation.  
Besides, because the European prohibition is new, there is no relevant 
case law.  At first glance, the prohibition applies to traders increasing the 
price from $10 to $11, provided that the price had previously been stable 
at $10 for a sufficient period of time.  Nevertheless, an adequate 
prohibition allows traders who execute supported price pressure and 
bans traders who exercise unsupported price pressure.  If Section 1(2)(a) 
DMA 2003 is interpreted in line with the “unsupported price pressure” 
standard, it would only be applicable to traders exercising unsupported 
price pressure.  From an economic perspective, it is reasonable to say 
that a trader who exercises supported price pressure causes a normal 
stock price, while a trader who exercises unsupported price pressure 
causes an abnormal stock price. 
There is another question to be answered.  Let us assume that the 
regulator interprets Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 in line with the 
                                                        
67 Trane Co. v. O’Connor Sec., 561 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D.N.Y. 1983). 
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“unsupported price pressure” standard.  Then the prohibition is 
definitely applicable to traders exercising unsupported price pressure 
and creating or reinforcing a price change.  But it remains unclear 
whether the prohibition applies to traders exercising unsupported price 
pressure, thereby stabilizing the price or mitigating a price change.  One 
could argue that a trader who stabilizes a price or mitigates a price 
change does not create an abnormal price.  As already stated, the 
prohibition does not define “abnormal level” and there is no relevant 
secondary legislation.  This leaves room for an extensive interpretation.  
It is advisable to interpret the prohibition in such way that it applies to 
traders exercising unsupported price pressure and thereby affecting stock 
prices.68  By doing so, the regulator is able to take action in all situations, 
no matter whether traders create, reinforce, stabilize, or mitigate a price 
change. 
Furthermore, legislators every so often design prohibitions to 
counteract traders who cause artificial prices.69  Section 1041A CA 2001 
refers to transactions that have the effect of creating an artificial price or 
maintaining it at a level that is artificial, while Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 
prohibits transactions which bring or secure the price at an artificial level.  
Obviously, these prohibitions distinguish between traders creating non-
artificial prices and traders creating artificial prices.  The first group of 
traders acts legitimately, while the second group acts illegitimately.  The 
problem remains that these prohibitions lack a precise delineation of 
“non-artificial price” versus “artificial price.”  As a result, a regulator is 
free to use the prohibitions to counteract various transactions, such as all 
transactions raising or depressing the price, uninformed transactions 
raising or depressing the price, transactions having the purpose of 
raising or depressing the price, or transactions moving the price away 
from the fundamental value. 
Thus, chances are that the regulator falsely employs Section 1041A 
CA 2001 or Section 1(2)(a) DMA 2003 in situations of supported price 
pressure or erroneously ignores the prohibition in situations of 
                                                        
68 See Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 731 (1986) (stating that a trader might manipulate even though he is 
not interested in affecting stock prices as an end in itself) (emphasis added); see also James H. 
Mathias, Manipulative Practice and The Securities Exchange Act, 3 U. PITT. L. REV. 7 (1936) 
(explaining that manipulation is “a planned effort to affect the market price of a security by 
artificial means”) (emphasis added). 
69 See James W. Moore & Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 
U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50 (1934) (“Manipulation leads to an artificial and controlled price.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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unsupported price pressure.  Both mistakes will most likely result in 
societal costs.  If the regulator uses the prohibition in situations of 
supported price pressure, he falsely qualifies a legitimate trader as a 
manipulator, and when he ignores the prohibition in situations of 
unsupported price pressure, he erroneously indemnifies a manipulator.  
A regulator would reduce these risks by interpreting the prohibitions in 
line with the “unsupported price pressure” standard, so that the 
distinction between non-artificial prices and artificial prices is well-
defined.  The reasoning is as follows: in the event that a trader exercises 
supported price pressure, he creates a non-artificial price and is a 
legitimate trader.  On the other hand, when the trader exercises 
unsupported price pressure, he creates an artificial price and might 
qualify as a manipulator. 
B. The Materiality Standard 
Section IV.A explains how legislators have to design a new 
prohibition on manipulation and how regulators could interpret current 
prohibitions.  The following analysis concentrates on the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure.  Prohibitions on manipulation may benefit 
from a materiality standard, just like the prohibition on information-
based manipulation and insider trading does. 
1. The Basics of the Materiality Standard 
Economic and legal scholars often consider manipulation to be 
binary.  Traders are either informed or uninformed.70  If the trader is 
informed and influences the stock price, he is no manipulator.  On the 
other hand, if the trader is uninformed and influences the stock price, he 
might qualify as a manipulator.  This binary approach shows little 
similarities with real-life situations.  Both informed traders and 
uninformed traders are able to exercise unsupported price pressure.  
                                                        
70 Aggarwal & Wu, supra note 2, at 1937 (“[A] key to successful manipulation is the 
pooling of the manipulator with the truthful informed party.  Hence, the manipulator 
needs either to be informed or to be able to credibly pose as being informed.”); see also 
HARRIS, supra note 7, at 266 (“Bluffers behave as though they are informed speculators, and 
they hope that others will believe they are well-informed speculators, but they do not have 
well-founded opinions about values.”); Yadlin, supra note 3, at 842 (“. . . I distinguish 
between informed and uninformed manipulators.  Both types of manipulators trade for the 
purpose of affecting the market price.  But informed manipulators are privy to private 
information that leads them to believe that the market has mispriced the stock and that 
their effect on the market will better reflect that stock’s value.”); Mahoney, supra note 8, at 
354-55 (“An easily tested alternative to the manipulation hypothesis is that the pools were 
informed.”). 
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Accordingly, the regulator cannot rely solely on the suspect’s 
information position.  He should always determine both the exercised 
price pressure and the justified price pressure before drawing any 
conclusions.  Having determined both exercised price pressure and 
justified price pressure, he is able to calculate the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure.  This step-by-step plan has been described 
in Section III.A. 
Consider the following examples: if a trader exercises a price 
pressure of +$5, while in possession of information pointing at future 
supported price pressure of +$4.5, the unsupported price pressure is 
+$0.5; on the other hand, if the exercised price pressure is +$5 and the 
trader is in possession of information pointing at future supported price 
pressure of +$0.5, the unsupported price pressure is +$4.5.  Clearly, the 
extent of the unsupported price pressure and, possibly, the size of the 
societal costs, vary significantly.  It would be impractical and unwise to 
maintain a prohibition on manipulation that covers any situation of 
unsupported price pressure.  There is no need to prohibit minor forms of 
unsupported price pressure, as the price influence and societal costs are 
negligible.  Besides, traders may become reluctant to execute welfare-
enhancing trades.  This might have a negative impact on market 
operations. 
In order to mitigate the negative consequences of an excessively 
strict regime, a materiality standard with respect to the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure is desirable.  This should not be a formal and 
codified materiality standard as in most prohibitions on information-
based manipulation and insider trading, but an informal and voluntary 
materiality standard to which the regulator could adhere.  A formal 
materiality standard would result in a high burden of proof.  The 
regulator should take into account the materiality of the unsupported 
price pressure in case he has a reliable estimate.  A materiality standard 
would not only encourage traders to trade competitively, but also create 
systematic consistency.  The U.S. and E.U. prohibitions on trade-based 
market manipulation currently do not have an explicit materiality 
standard, while the U.S. and E.U. prohibitions on information-based 
manipulation and on insider trading do.71 
                                                        
71 The materiality standard would allow market participants to exercise little 
unsupported price pressure, even when they expect a profit.  The reason is straightforward: 
companies and other market participants would otherwise become reluctant to execute 
transactions that result in little unsupported price pressure, while the costs of these trades 
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The application of a materiality standard, with an eye on the new 
definitions herein, would be as follows: the regulator first determines the 
extent of the exercised and justified price pressure, e.g. +$3 and +$2, 
before calculating the extent of the unsupported price pressure, that is, 
+$1; the regulator then decides what the minimal level of unsupported 
price pressure ought to be, for example, +$2.  This normative judgment is 
usually based on a comparative assessment between the institutional 
interests and investor protection.  If the regulator or judge strives for 
paternalistic securities regulation, he sets the minimal level very low.  
Conversely, if the regulator believes in liberal securities regulation, the 
minimal level is high.  A market participant risks a violation of the 
prohibition on manipulation if the extent of the unsupported price 
pressure exceeds the minimal level.  In the foregoing example, the 
unsupported price pressure of +$1 is irrelevant, considering the minimal 
level of +$2. 
2. The Correction of the Materiality Standard 
So far, for expositional clarity, the discussion has been limited to the 
materiality of the unsupported price pressure, ignoring the materiality of 
the unsupported profit.  Immaterial unsupported price pressure, 
however, sometimes results in a large unsupported profit.  A regulator, 
who adheres to the described materiality standard, does not take 
measures against immaterial unsupported price pressure, even when 
this goes together with a large unsupported profit.  Such decision is 
undesirable, as the societal costs may be large.  A regulator should look 
at both the extent of the unsupported price pressure and the size of the 
unsupported profit.  In the end, it is not only the extent of the 
unsupported price pressure but also the size of the unsupported profit 
that is a good indicator of the societal costs.  Therefore, the regulator 
should fine immaterial unsupported price pressure as long as it results in 
a large unsupported profit. 
The regulator should investigate whether the unsupported price 
pressure was material.  If this is not the case, he should assess whether 
any unsupported profit was material.  However, should the regulator 
estimate the expected profit72 or the realized profit?73  There are a few 
                                                                                                                            
are negligible.  Likewise, companies are allowed to spread untrue or misleading 
information as long as it has a small impact, while management can legitimately use inside 
information as long as it is immaterial. 
72 Economic models of manipulation fulfill the rational actor assumption by using 
expected profit.  See, e.g., Gastineau & Jarrow, supra note 3, at 41 (“[T]he trader undertakes 
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practical arguments to focus on expected profit.  Firstly, the proof of an 
expected profit is less complicated than the proof of a realized profit.  
Indeed, the regulator only has to prove that a trader exercised 
unsupported price pressure, while he could expect to profit from his 
action in the near future.  Secondly, the prohibition would apply to both 
traders who attempt to manipulate the market and traders who are 
actually successful.  Accordingly, this approach prevents a complex 
distinction between failing and successful manipulators.  It is wise to 
perform just a marginal investigation with respect to the extent of the 
unsupported profit. 
As already stated, an informal materiality standard with respect to 
the extent of the unsupported price pressure is desirable.  Likewise, an 
informal materiality standard as to the unsupported profit could be 
beneficial.  Consider the following example, in which both materiality 
standards are explained.  Imagine a trader who buys 1,000 shares of ABC 
and exercises price pressure of +$0.5, so that the price of ABC shares 
rises from $20 to $20.5 per share.  Assume that the trader has an 
informational privilege, knowing that the price should be $20.3.  This 
means that the trader has exercised supported price pressure of +$0.3 
and unsupported price pressure of +$0.2.  If the regulator adheres to the 
materiality standard and qualifies the unsupported price pressure of 
+$0.2 as irrelevant, he cannot apply the prohibition and fine the 
behavior, except when the unsupported profit and the societal costs are 
large. 
The regulator will have to assess the unsupported profit.  Having 
exercised price pressure of +$0.5, the trader sells one million shares of 
ABC in a contractual person-to-person deal, while the price of this deal is 
derived from the price on the exchange.  By exercising price pressure of 
+$0.5, the trader makes a total profit of $500,000.  Assuming that the 
costs of exercising unsupported price pressure are small and that 
corrective traders were absent, one can calculate that the supported 
profit was as large as $300,000 and the unsupported profit $200,000.  If 
the regulator has the ability to discover the extent of the unsupported 
profit, he then has to set a minimal level, depending on his ideas about 
the level of investor protection.  He has a reason to fine the unsupported 
                                                                                                                            
it anyway, expecting to profit from advantages related to size and intertemporal differences 
in market impact.”) (emphasis added). 
73 Cf. Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 510 (“Manipulative trades could be defined as 
profitable trades . . .  the resulting profit comes solely from the trader’s ability to move prices 
and not from his possession of valuable information.”) (emphasis added). 
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price pressure if the unsupported profit, which is $200,000, is larger than 
the minimal size of the unsupported profit, e.g., when the minimum level 
is $50,000. 
C. Mens Rea Elements 
Having reduced the definition of manipulation to “exercising 
unsupported price pressure,” there is a smaller role for the mens rea than 
many authors claim.  Indeed, if a regulator would adopt the proposed 
standard, traders are protected as long as they execute supported price 
pressure.  Nonetheless, the legislator is free to take up a mens rea 
element.  By doing so, the legislator would protect traders who are not 
culpable of exercising unsupported price pressure. 
1. The Relevance of the Mens Rea 
Normally, a legislator develops a prohibition in a natural sequence.  
He might want to prohibit certain behavior because of the supposed 
societal costs.  After a legislator has decided to do so, he could include a 
mens rea element, emphasizing culpability.  Many legal systems prefer 
prohibitions that include a mens rea element.  According to general 
consensus, one should keep punishment abreast of culpability.  
However, legal systems generally do not require this proportionality, 
especially when it comes to economic crimes.  They allow for a “strict” 
liability regime, which does not take into account culpability.74  
Legislators regularly design prohibitions that cover harmful economic 
activities without any reference to the mens rea.  The idea is that these 
activities have a large impact and as such should be prohibited, 
irrespective of the culpability of the defendant.  Yet, even under such a 
strict liability-regime, offenders usually have the opportunity to make a 
claim to various mens rea defenses. 
Since this Article shows that the legislator is able to objectively define 
manipulation, while legal systems allow legislators to design 
                                                        
74 See, e.g., (for the U.S.) SANFORD H. KADISH AND STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 235-37 (2001) (“While the general rule at common law was that 
scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime . . . there has 
been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of 
which would be obstructed by such a requirement.”); (and for the E.U.) Saliabaku v. France, 
14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988) (“In particular, and again in principle, the Contracting States may, 
under certain conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether 
it results from criminal intent or from negligence.  Examples of such offences may be found 
in the laws of the Contracting States.”). 
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prohibitions according to “strict liability,” it is remarkable that scholars 
often automatically link manipulation with a mens rea element.75  Some 
scholars even claim that one can only delineate manipulation by 
evaluating the state of mind.76  For example, Fischel and Ross have 
argued that “there is no objective definition of manipulation.”  
According to them, “[t]he only definition that makes any sense is 
subjective.”  Fischel and Ross put forward a couple of arguments to 
underpin these statements.  They, however, stress in fact the importance 
of a well-defined objective side of manipulation rather than the 
importance of the mens rea.  Indeed, the suggested “unsupported price 
pressure” standard would remove most of the advanced problems, even 
without reference to the mens rea.77 
                                                        
75 See, e.g., Yadlin, supra note 3, at 840 (“. . . I define stock manipulation as the buying (or 
selling) of a security for the purpose of increasing (or depressing) its market price.”); see 
also Thel, supra note 7, at 221 n.17 (“[T]he word ‘manipulation’ means buying a security for 
the purpose of increasing the reported price or selling a security for the purpose of 
decreasing the reported price.”); Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 393 (1990) (“[M]anipulation means anything in 
particular, it means conduct intended to induce people to trade a security or force its price 
to an artificial level”); Mathias, supra note 68, at 7 (“Manipulation, which may be defined as 
a planned effort to affect the market price of a security by artificial means, has been a 
troublesome problem for centuries.”). 
76 See, e.g., Ferrarini, supra note 3, at 724 (“The Directive does not include any reference 
to intent, which is often considered as an essential element of manipulation. . . . [I]t is 
doubtful that manipulation can be adequately defined by omitting any reference to 
intent.”); Jesper L. Hansen, The New Proposal for a European Union Directive on Market Abuse, 
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 241, 267 (2002) (“Some of these examples are acceptable, such as 
wash sales.  Others bristle with difficulties, such as trading specifically to interfere with the 
spot or the settlement price of derivative contracts.  Here, an evaluation of the person’s 
state of mind seems necessary.”); GOLDWASSER, supra note 3, at 109 (“The line between 
legitimate and manipulative trading is a very thin one.  The distinction depends upon 
proof of the requisite intent on the part of the defendant.”); Vauplane & Simart, supra note 
1, at 229 (referring to the heading, “Paramount Importance of the Intent Element”); Poser, 
supra note 68, at 729 (“Where a person is accused of manipulating a stock through trading, 
his activities . . . are in themselves consistent with the perfectly innocuous . . .  purpose of 
making a profit.  This is in contrast with other manipulative techniques, such as false 
statements, bribery, or fictitious transactions, which, being deceptive or at least wrongful in 
themselves, require a less specific intent to make them manipulative.”). 
77 Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 509-10.  Their first argument is that “traders with 
private information who disguise their trades with the effect that prices do not move in the 
correct direction, or even move in the wrong direction, also trade with ‘good’ intent and 
thus are not engaged in manipulation because their ultimate profit is attributable to the 
private information they possess.”  Id. at 510.  This group of traders, however, does not 
need the protection of “good intent,” since traders who protect their information will not 
cause any price pressure.  And if they do cause price pressure, it will most likely be 
supported.  Fischel and Ross further raise the question, “what happens if the trades move 
prices in one direction because the trader genuinely believes that prices will move in this 
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This does not mean that a prohibition on manipulation should be 
completely objective.  Rather, a prohibition should emphasize the 
objective side of manipulation without overstressing the mens rea.  If a 
legislator designs a prohibition in line with the “unsupported price 
pressure” standard, the introduction of a mens rea element is, at most, 
optional.  The description of costly behavior, namely exercising 
unsupported price pressure, is disconnected from the culpability.  
Conversely, if a legislator has designed a prohibition that is too broad, in 
the sense that it covers more situations than “exercising unsupported 
price pressure,” a legislator could better rethink the objective side, than 
recover the definition with a mens rea element.  Rethinking the objective 
side secures the quality and transparency of jurisdiction, while 
continuing a broad prohibition replaces the individual assessment of the 
“unsupported price pressure” and the “culpability” with a single 
assessment of the mens rea, resulting in a mingling of different elements. 
2. The Implementation of the Mens Rea 
Should the suggested prohibition on manipulation, which is 
completely objective, incorporate a mens rea element to include 
culpability?  Some people will claim that an adequate prohibition merely 
applies to traders who are culpable of exercising unsupported price 
pressure.  Other people will argue that a prohibition with a mens rea 
element raises the burden of proof in an unjustifiable way.  Taking a 
stance in this legal doctrinal debate is beyond the scope of this Article.  
Nevertheless, if a legislator prefers a prohibition with a mens rea element, 
he will have to think about the design of this element.  Most discussions 
on the prohibition on manipulation ignore this question.  A legislator 
could grosso modo design the mens rea element in line with the mens rea 
elements in the prohibition on information-based manipulation and the 
prohibition on insider trading. 
The U.S. and E.U. regimes against information-based manipulation 
prescribe that the person was at least “reckless.”  Basically, under Rule 
10b-5, the regulator has to prove that the person was reckless in regard 
                                                                                                                            
direction, but the trader turns out to be wrong and prices ultimately move in the opposite 
direction?”  Id. at 509.  Their answer is that, “[t]rading based on a genuine belief that prices 
will ultimately move in the direction of the trades is the essence of nonmanipulative 
trading.”  But the standard of unsupported price pressure is sufficient in this case.  A trader 
with a weak belief is allowed to exercise little price pressure.  In addition, a trader with 
significant information can exercise large price pressure.  If traders follow this rule of 
thumb, they will exercise supported price pressure. 
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to the information deficiency.78  Likewise, under the European 
prohibition on information-based manipulation, the regulator should 
prove that the person knew or was reckless in not knowing about the 
information deficiency.79  Furthermore, the U.S. and E.U. regimes against 
insider trading require that there is some type of “knowledge” with 
respect to the inside information.  Despite the fact that case law under 
Rule 10b-5 is ambiguous, prescribing either the “knowing possession 
of”80 or “the use of inside information,”81 the regulator has to prove some 
type of “knowledge.”  The same applies to the European prohibition on 
insider trading, which is applicable to the “use of”82 inside information. 
So, a legislator has at least two models to design the mens rea element 
in the prohibition on trade-based market manipulation.  The first model 
connects liability to “recklessness in not knowing that one exercises 
unsupported price pressure” and the second model to “knowing that 
one exercises unsupported price pressure.”  The first model is preferable 
from a practical point of view.  Lowering the minimum mental state to 
“recklessness in not knowing” makes the proof of manipulation less 
complicated.  Further, trade-based market manipulation relates more to 
information-based manipulation, which uses the “recklessness in not 
knowing” element, than to insider trading. Consequently, the trader 
would be allowed to underestimate the extent of his price pressure, 
overestimate his information position, and/or miscalculate the justified 
price pressure, as long as he is not reckless in not knowing that he does 
so.  I endorse the view that this approach results in a complex 
assessment.  At the same time, it makes the adjudication adequate and 
transparent. 
                                                        
78 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976) (deciding that negligence is 
not actionable under Rule 10b-5); see also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 
1033, 1044 (7th Cir. 1977) (deciding that a reckless omission of material facts are actionable 
under Rule 10b-5).  Criminal proceedings require willful violations of the Act, according to 
Section 32(a) SEA 1934. 
79 European Parliament Directive 2003/6/EC of Jan. 2003, § 1(2)(a).  According to 
Section 1(2)(c) MAD 2003, it is prohibited to disseminate false or misleading information 
“where the person who made the dissemination knew, or ought to have known, that the 
information was false or misleading.”  Id. 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 1993) (arguing that the 
“knowing possession of inside information” is sufficient). 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1069 (9th Cir. 1998) (deciding that the 
“use of inside information” should be required in criminal cases). 
82 European Parliament Directive 2003/6/EC of Jan. 2003, § 2(1)(a).  Section 2(1)(a) of 
MAD states: “Member States shall prohibit any person . . .  who possesses inside 
information from using that information by acquiring or disposing of . . . financial 
instruments . . . .”  Id. 
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V.  APPLICATION AND EXTENSION 
A. Application 
The application of the prohibition on manipulation has been 
troublesome since its introduction.  Regulators find it hard to prove that 
suspects have manipulated the market.  The “unsupported price 
pressure” standard will not bring relief and asks for an assessment of the 
justified price pressure.  Yet, a regulator has two methods to prove the 
exercise of unsupported price pressure: direct proof and alternative 
proof. 
1. Direct Proof of Unsupported Price Pressure 
The preferred way to prove unsupported price pressure is by 
arguing that the exercised price pressure was larger than the justified 
price pressure, formal proof, or to present incriminating records and 
statements, record proof.  The formal method limits the probability of 
Type I errors.  However, it is hard to discover the information position of 
the suspect at the moment of trading, so that the approximation of the 
justified price pressure is questionable.  Further, the regulator, of course, 
welcomes records and statements that incriminate the suspect, but in 
most suspicious situations there simply are none.  I do not consider this 
as a weakness of the analysis.  It shows why proof of unsupported price 
pressure is hard to produce.  The following paragraphs examine the idea 
and application of formal proof and record proof, notwithstanding that 
only a small percentage of the cases allows for these types of proof. 
Sections II and III explain how a regulator could uncover formal 
evidence of unsupported price pressure.  I will shortly recapitulate the 
step-by-step process here.  Sections II.B.1 and Section II.B.2 explain how 
the regulator should first investigate the extent of the exercised price 
pressure by approximating and polishing this value.  He will then have 
to discover the information position of the suspect at the moment of 
trading.  Thereupon, the information ought to be translated into the 
justified price pressure.  If the regulator has determined both the 
exercised price pressure and justified price pressure, he has all the 
information to decide on the quality of the exercised price pressure.  It is 
recommendable that a regulator, who decides that the suspect has 
exercised unsupported price pressure, investigates if either the 
unsupported price pressure is material or, in case the suspect has 
benefited, the unsupported profit is material. 
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A regulator will now and then have recordings of suspicious 
conversations, which may be sufficient to prove the exercise of 
unsupported price pressure.  One can think of the following recording: 
“I prefer a stock price of $12 instead of $10.  Could you buy a large 
amount of shares and inflate the stock price?  I will compensate you for 
all costs.  The regulator will qualify this as manipulation, but I really 
need a high price at the moment.”  It would be a clear-cut case of 
unsupported price pressure, if the conversation partner actually buys a 
large amount of shares and inflates the stock price.  The regulator could 
argue that the suspect probably exercised unsupported price pressure as 
large as +$2 and can then make a judgment about the materiality.  Yet, 
the proof will be more troublesome when the recording is vague, leaving 
room for a scenario in which the suspect exercised supported price 
pressure. 
2. Alternative Proof of Unsupported Price Pressure 
In most situations, the regulator will probably not be able to provide 
formal proof of manipulation, nor collect incriminating records.  
Alternatively, he will most likely focus on two specific situations.  First, 
imagine a trader exercising extreme price pressure, for example +$5, 
which he can hardly justify with an information set.  Second, consider a 
trader who executes exceptional trades and price pressure right before he 
is in a position to make a profit that is dependent on the price pressure.  
Both situations provide indications that the trader has exercised 
unsupported price pressure.  Further, there might be sufficient 
indications of the extent of the unsupported price pressure.  This Section 
discusses these situations and how to deal with the proof of unsupported 
price pressure and the materiality. 
In principle, a trader does not want to exercise price pressure, let 
alone extreme price pressure, as he would trade at subordinate prices 
and make a loss.  Nevertheless, there are examples of traders making 
mistakes when communicating orders to broker-dealers and examples of 
broker-dealers making mistakes when entering the order, resulting in 
extreme price pressure.  Consider a trader exercising price pressure of 
+$5, so that the stock price rises by ten percent.  Under these 
circumstances, a regulator is able to bear the evidence, since it is unlikely 
that the suspect can justify the price pressure with a sufficiently large 
information set.  Of course, the suspect may provide proof to the 
contrary.  In the absence of any rebuttal, the regulator is able to conclude 
that the extreme price pressure of +$5 is completely unsupported and 
that such unsupported price pressure is material. 
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Otherwise, the regulator might bear the evidence when the suspect 
cumulatively: (1) shows exceptional trading behavior, that is, his trading 
behavior deviates from his regular trading behavior;83 (2) exercises 
exceptional price pressure, that is, he exercises more price pressure than 
he normally exercises;84 and (3) is able to make a profit, which is 
dependent on the exceptional price pressure.85  Consider the situation in 
which the trader shows exceptional trading behavior by buying a large 
amount of ABC shares on the exchange and exercising upward price 
pressure of +$1, right before he sells an even larger amount of ABC 
shares in a contractual person-to-person deal at a price derived from the 
price on the exchange.  When there is sufficient evidence that the price 
pressure of +$1 was completely unsupported, the question remains 
whether +$1 is considered to be material unsupported price pressure.  If 
the regulator decides that such unsupported price pressure is in fact 
immaterial, he could investigate whether the suspect realized a material 
unsupported profit.  This appraisal is contextual.86 
B. Extension 
Other prohibitions and parts of prohibitions might benefit from the 
“unsupported price pressure” standard as well.  The prohibitions on 
                                                        
83 The trading behavior may be qualified as exceptional when: (1) the number and the 
size of transactions deviates; (2) the interval between transactions is smaller; (3) the timing 
and the pattern of the transactions is different; (4) the type of instrument is conspicuous; 
and/or (5) the trader uses market-orders instead of limit-orders. 
84 The price pressure is exceptional when a trader, who normally does not exercise any 
price pressure or minor price pressure, suddenly exercises large price pressure.  This is 
suspicious when the trader exercises this price pressure shortly before he can make a profit 
that is dependent on this price pressure. 
85 The price pressure may go together with an expected profit, for example, when the 
trader first exercises upward price pressure on the exchange and then sells a large amount 
of derivatives in another market on the exchange.  Furthermore, exercising price pressure 
on the exchange in the shadow of contracts, offerings, and takeovers might be profitable 
due to static prices of the exchange. 
86 It should be noted that the regulator, under the given circumstances, cannot 
automatically conclude that a trader exercised unsupported price pressure.  There is 
always a chance that the exercised price pressure was completely supported or 
immaterially unsupported.  Therefore, the regulator should look for additional 
circumstantial evidence that supports the hypothesis of unsupported price pressure.  
Besides, he should carefully analyze facts and circumstances which throw doubt upon the 
hypothesis of unsupported price pressure.  Also, the regulator cannot conclude that the 
trader exercised unsupported price pressure if there is a large interval between the moment 
of exercising price pressure and the moment of benefiting from the price pressure.  A 
trader would probably not exercise unsupported price pressure if he cannot benefit from it 
right away.  The trader would give corrective traders the chance to remove the market 
inefficiency, thereby losing his opportunity to make an unsupported profit. 
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manipulation in the United States, European Union, and Australia are 
not only applicable to traders who raise or depress the stock price, but 
also to traders who create apparent active trading and induce other 
traders to follow suit.  The prohibitions are vague in this respect.  
Besides, the prohibition of corners and squeezes has proven to be 
problematic.  The main question is how to distinguish between 
legitimate and manipulative corners and squeezes.  This Section will 
examine if and how legislators might overcome these shortcomings with 
the proposed standard. 
1. Unsupported Market Information 
As yet, the analysis has ignored the situation in which a trader 
executes transactions at t, not exercising any direct price pressure at t+1, 
but spreading market information at t+2, so that the market might create 
indirect price pressure at t+3.  Normally, an informed trader values his 
information position highly and tries to protect it.  As long as an 
informed trader can protect his information privilege, he will be able to 
make a profit by trading financial instruments.  In order to protect his 
information from other market participants, he will act discreetly and 
limit the obtrusiveness of his transactions.  Nevertheless, he will have to 
act before the information becomes public by disclosure or research.  As 
the informed trader starts trading more aggressively, he will spread 
more market information and break off his information privilege.  Other 
market participants pick up this information and use it for their trading 
decisions.87 
In principle, an uninformed trader does not spread valuable market 
information and will be ignored by the rest of the market.  Nonetheless, 
if an uninformed manipulator mimics the behavior of an informed 
trader, he can voluntarily spread false or misleading market information, 
which market participants believe to be true, possibly causing indirect 
unsupported price pressure.  He could, for example, increase the number 
and/or the size of his transactions, while trading at times when 
informed traders trade.  By changing the characteristics of the trades, the 
uninformed trader falsely signals that he is informed.  Market 
participants might believe these signals: Why else would he take a 
chance to attract traders and trade at subordinate prices?  This way an 
uninformed trader might motivate traders to jump on the bandwagon, 
                                                        
87 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 31, at 572-79.  Gilson and Kraakman have 
described this refined mechanism of derivatively informed trading through trade decoding 
and price decoding.  Id. 
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causing indirect unsupported price pressure.  Such an uninformed trader 
in fact spreads false or misleading information about the value of 
financial instruments. 
Legislators sometimes qualify trading at t as manipulative when it 
creates no direct price pressure at t+1, but produces false or misleading 
market information at t+2 (irrespective of the potential indirect price 
pressure at t+3).  Three prohibitions in particular apply to this situation, 
these being Section 9(a) of the SEA, Section 1(2)(a) MAD and Section 
1041B CA.  Section 9(a) of the SEA formulates it as “creating actual or 
apparent active trading in” a security “for the purpose of inducing the 
purchase or sale of such security by others.”  Next, Section 1(2)(a) MAD 
2003/6/EC applies to “transactions . . . which give, or are likely to give, 
false or misleading signals as to the supply of, demand for or price of 
financial instruments.”  Likewise, Section 1041B CA prohibits, for 
example, an act that “is likely to have the effect of creating, or causing 
the creation of, a false or misleading appearance . . . of active trading.” 
These prohibitions are not completely clear at face value and deserve 
an adequate interpretation.  First, Section 9(a) of the SEA vaguely defines 
the objective side.  What do parts like “actual or apparent active trading” 
and “inducing the purchase or sale” mean?  It further relies heavily on 
the mens rea, by using the constituent element “for the purpose of 
inducing.”  The European and Australian definitions are objective, but 
again, without an explicit delineation.  The European prohibition points 
at creating “false or misleading signals,” while the Australian 
prohibition describes it as “a false or misleading appearance . . . of active 
trading.”  The problem with these two descriptions is the lack of an 
explicit standard.  When is the signal or the appearance false or 
misleading?  The “unsupported price pressure” standard cannot be used 
to interpret the prohibitions, since there is no direct price pressure, only 
market information. 
The solution is converting the “unsupported price pressure” 
standard into an “unsupported market information” standard, 
distinguishing between high- and low-quality market information.  The 
trading results in supported market information if the trader possesses 
sufficient information.  Otherwise, the trading results in unsupported 
market information.  The prohibitions in effect can be replaced with, or 
interpreted in line with, the “unsupported market information” 
standard.  Section 9(a) of the SEA could be interpreted as executing 
transactions that result in unsupported market information for the purpose of 
inducing the purchase or sale of a security by others, Section 1(2)(a) MAD 
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2003/6/EC as executing transactions that result in unsupported market 
information as to the supply of, demand for, or price of financial instruments, 
and Section 1041B CA as an act that results in unsupported market 
information. 
Thus, a trader manipulates the market when he trades and spreads 
unsupported market information.  A regulator will have to approximate 
the extent of the dispersed market information and the extent of the 
underlying information before he can draw any conclusions about the 
quality of the market information.  If the dispersed market information is 
larger than the underlying information, the market information was false 
or misleading.  It is not hard to imagine that a regulator will have 
problems applying the “unsupported market information” standard in 
practice—they will rarely be able to furnish proof.  This shortcoming, 
however, relates more to the complexity of regulating manipulation, 
than to quality of the “unsupported market information” standard. 
There is, however, an exception. Fictitious transactions, like wash sales 
and matched orders, will spread false or misleading information by 
definition. 
2. Corners and Squeezes 
A futures contract calls for delivery of a commodity, whereby the 
maturity date and agreed-upon price are specified.  A futures contract 
involves two contracting parties.  The trader taking the long position 
commits to purchasing the commodity at the maturity date, while the 
trader taking the short position commits to delivering the commodity on 
that date.  A futures contract is a zero-sum game: The trader who takes 
the long position has a profit that equals the spot price at maturity minus 
the agreed-upon price, while the trader who takes the short position has 
a profit that equals the agreed-upon price minus the spot price at 
maturity.88  The trader who takes the long position profits and the trader 
who takes the short position loses when the spot price rises, just as the 
long loses and the short profits when the spot price drops.  Hedgers and 
speculators use futures markets for different reasons.  Hedgers use 
futures contracts to reduce the risk of variable spot prices.  By contrast, 
speculators use futures contracts to anticipate variable futures prices.89 
Futures contracts provide opportunities for manipulation.  A trader 
creates market power by buying a large part of the deliverable supply of 
                                                        
88 See, e.g., ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 740-41 (2002). 
89 Id. at 750. 
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the commodity, referred to as a corner, and/or taking a large long 
position, referred to as a squeeze, thereby forcing the shorts to deliver 
the commodity at the expiration day.  Since the shorts are only able to 
acquire the commodity at increasing marginal costs due to scarcity in the 
delivery market, and due to transportation costs as regards to other 
markets, the spot price and futures price rise.  The manipulator profits 
from his market power, because the shorts have to settle at an inflated 
price.  The manipulator buys, for example, a large amount of wheat and 
takes a large long position, thereby creating market power.  Next, he 
limits the supply of the wheat and requires a large amount of deliveries, 
thereby inflating the spot price from $20 to $25.  Shorts must either 
purchase commodities at an extra $5 or negotiate a cash settlement 
between $0 and $5, which equals the profit of the manipulator. 
Generally, the problem is how to distinguish between normal and 
manipulative market power.  The analysis focuses on defining the 
distinction instead of tracing potential forms of manipulative market 
power.  As the Introduction explains, after defining the concept of 
behavior, other points of controversy can be more readily discussed.  
Considering prior articles on corners and squeezes, authors regularly use 
two models to distinguish between normal and manipulative market 
power.  The first model distinguishes between normal and artificial 
demand, or normal and artificial prices.90  Normal demand results in a 
normal price and artificial demand in an artificial price.  The second 
model discriminates between intent to create normal prices and intent to 
create artificial prices, or between intent to trade legitimately and intent 
to corner or squeeze the market.91  Basically, both models require a 
                                                        
90 See Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a 
Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 960 (1994).  Pirrong argues that “price 
artificiality is the sine qua non of manipulation.”  Id.  Also, Jerry W. Markham argues that a 
manipulator “is buying so many futures contracts and such large quantities of the 
underlying commodity that its market power is sufficient to create and sustain a 
manipulated or artificial price.”  Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures 
Prices—The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 283 (1991). 
91 Fischel and Ross conclude that definition is impossible without assessment of intent.  
Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 547 (“[W]e are left with no objective definition of 
manipulation in futures markets.”).  Richard D. Friedman states that, “[a]lthough intent is 
an essential element of a squeeze under the classical approach, it is the intent to create an 
artificial price.”  Richard D. Friedman, Stalking the Squeeze: Understanding Commodities 
Market Manipulation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 30, 58 (1990). 
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precise definition of normal and artificial demand or prices, which the 
literature has not yet provided.92 
What are the conditions to qualify demand or prices as normal or 
artificial?  According to the “unsupported price pressure” standard, the 
regulator should compare the exercised price pressure with the justified 
price pressure.  A trader exercises supported price pressure and creates a 
normal futures price when the exercised price pressure is equal to or less 
than the justifiable price pressure.  Logically, the trader exercises 
unsupported price pressure and creates an artificial futures price when 
the exercised price pressure is larger than the justified price pressure.  
The method to determine the extent of the exercised price pressure is 
explained in Section II.B, and the method to derive the justifiable price 
pressure in Section III.A.2.  The justifiable price pressure should be 
derived from the information position of the trader.  The term 
“information” includes all information that: (1) points at an 
undervaluation or overvaluation of a futures contract or (2) points at 
coming supported price pressure with respect to a futures contract. 
Thus, a trader manipulates the market when he exercises 
unsupported price pressure in the futures market, which accompanies an 
expected profit due to cornering the market and/or squeezing the shorts.  
It is important to note that a trader who buys a large part of the 
deliverable supply or takes a large long position, thereby exercising price 
pressure in the futures market and making a profit by cornering the 
market and/or squeezing the shorts, is not automatically a manipulator.  
The trader might have sufficient information that he or other persons or 
companies will demand large amounts of the commodity, for example 
wheat, in the near future, so that the exercised price pressure is 
supported.  This means that a regulator will always have to assess the 
information position and the potential demand of the suspect.  It further 
means that an objective definition of futures manipulation is sufficient.93  
As Section IV.C.1 explains, legislators may include a mens rea element; 
however, they are not obliged to do so. 
                                                        
92 See, e.g., Fischel & Ross, supra note 3, at 546 (arguing that the concept of price 
artificiality brings no solution to distinguish between legitimate and manipulative market 
power); Friedman, supra note 91, at 54-55 (criticizing some interpretations of the term 
“artificial price”); Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 117-18 (arguing that real demand and 
artificial demand are indistinguishable). 
93 Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 47, at 117-18 (“No one accumulates futures contracts—for 
reasons good or ill—unaware of what he is doing.  Everyone in the futures market intends 
to make as much money as he can.  Scrutiny of intent therefore is not likely to assist in the 
search for manipulation.”). 
Nelemans: Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
1218 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Trade-based market manipulation has received wide attention in 
theoretical and policy discussions, even though the behavior is still 
poorly defined in both economic and legal literature.  This Article 
contributes to an understanding of manipulation by providing a precise 
definition of the concept, that being exercising unsupported price pressure.  
The Article explains how legislators could design an adequate 
prohibition on manipulation and how regulators might improve and 
interpret contemporary prohibitions.  It further provides insights in how 
to enforce a prohibition on manipulation. 
A regulator should focus on the extent of price pressure rather than 
on the size of stock price changes.  “Price pressure” is defined as the 
contribution of a set of transactions to the total price change.  
Consequently, it is possible to distinguish between the contribution of 
the suspect and the contributions of other market participants to the 
stock price change.  If a regulator would not look at the contribution of 
the suspect but at the stock price variance during the trading of the 
suspect, the regulator most likely overestimates or underestimates the 
contribution of the suspect to the stock price change. 
Another recommendation is that a regulator ought to allow 
supported price pressure and ban unsupported price pressure.  
Supported price pressure has an adequate influence on the stock price, 
while unsupported price pressure creates a market inefficiency.  If a 
trader’s price pressure is larger than the justifiable price pressure, he 
produces unsupported price pressure.  The exercised price pressure 
minus the justified price pressure is the extent of the unsupported price 
pressure. Otherwise, if a trader’s price pressure is equal to or less than 
the justifiable price pressure, he produces supported price pressure. 
An adequate prohibition on manipulation applies to all transactions 
that result in unsupported price pressure, causing extra price volatility 
and extra information asymmetries.  A trader exercising unsupported 
price pressure initiates welfare shifts between uninformed traders on the 
one hand and corrective traders or himself on the other hand.  Indeed, a 
trader who exercises unsupported price pressure creates an 
informational privilege, of which he may take advantage.  In conclusion, 
we can say that unsupported price pressure results in welfare shifts and 
reduced liquidity, which has a negative impact on market operations. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 [2008], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/4
2008] Redefining Trade-Based Market Manipulation 1219 
The Article has some policy implications.  It shows that legislators 
should design a prohibition on manipulation according to the 
“unsupported price pressure” standard and interpret contemporary 
prohibitions in line with this standard.  Viewed in this context, one can 
see why a regulator should take into account the materiality of the 
unsupported price pressure if possible.  Further, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, the prohibition should better stress the objective 
side of manipulation than the mens rea.  Finally, attention is paid to the 
way the regulator has to prove the exercise of unsupported price 
pressure. 
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